Africa Biomass Company (ABC) has been a pioneer in the development of biomass processing such as wood chips, biofuel, and mulch in both the agriculture and forestry industries in South Africa and sub-Saharan Africa over the past two decades.
In 2004 Willem van der Merwe, founder, and CEO of Africa Biomass Company, bought a small, specialised tree felling company and used wood chippers to enhance productivity. Over time these services and equipment were used in agriculture, river rehabilitation projects, and lately also forestry, with a focus on biomass to energy and under canopy mulching.
ABC has grown to meet increasing demand for these services and now has nine production teams using the latest biomass processing equipment and techniques to process plantation residue, alien invasive trees, and encroacher bushes.
ABC specialises in providing contracting services in the following core operations: -
Land Preparation Serrat mulchers have demonstrated their effectiveness as a comprehensive solution for land preparation before replanting. Plantation managers see this as the future of single-step preparation, replacing the previously used herbicides, burning, and manual labour, which were both labour-intensive and had a detrimental impact on the soil conditions.
Under Canopy Mulching and Fire Management In South Africa, the practice of under canopy mulching is gaining traction as part of an integrated fire management strategy to reduce fuel loads, such as prunings. ABC is excited about the results obtained through multiple trials in various regions using the rugged Serrat mulchers to process fuel load in an efficient, cost-effective, and ecologically beneficial way to the environment. The Serrat forestry mulchers, available as part of ABC’s contracting fleet or to purchase, come in several widths and can process several diameters of material according to the client’s need.
Biomass to Energy Correctly sourced biomass is environmentally friendly, renewable, abundantly available, and cost-effective fuel that can be combusted as a source of fuel to generate heat for a variety of applications. Typical sustainable sources of biomass are offcuts from sustainably managed commercial plantations, recycled orchard and vineyard residues, and most importantly invasive alien vegetation that is cleared as part of river rehabilitation projects. Harvesting unwanted alien vegetation increases water runoff, decreases the risk of bush fires, and contributes to the restoration of natural vegetation.
ABC is an authorised dealer for Bandit wood chippers, Serrat mulchers, Badger biomass equipment and Dezzi equipment. They are based in Worcester in the Western Cape and have branches in George (W. Cape), Kirkwood (Eastern Cape), Upington (Northern Cape), Parys (Free State), Tzaneen (Limpopo) and Nelspruit (Mpumalanga).
ABC places a high value on customer well-being and after-sales support, and each customer's operations are treated as unique, with custom-tailored solutions.
ABC are Gold Sponsors at this year’s Focus on Forestry Conference taking place at Karkloof in the KZN midlands from 7-9 November, and conference delegates are invited to visit their stand. ABC CEO Willem van der Merwe will address the following topic on Wednesday, 8th November at 11:55: “The latest biomass processing equipment and techniques available to process plantation residue, alien invasive trees, and encroacher bush.”
For more info visit ABC’s website at www.abc.co.za, their YouTube channel at “Africa Biomass Company” or contact the ABC head office at 023 342 1212.
For a full list of new and used equipment for sale, send an email to: info@abc.co.za
‘Our roots are in timber’
Safire CEO Pierre Bekker (left), with Gareth Smallbones, Manager: Agriculture.
Safire has evolved from specialist timber insurer to offering a diversified range of insurance products, providing protection to clients in an increasingly volatile world …
Pierre Bekker, CEO of Pietermaritzburg-based Safire Insurance, discusses the dynamics of the current insurance market, and acknowledges the solid foundation created through their timber insurance business.
“Global insurance has been very difficult for the past few years, both in terms of claims expenses from natural catastrophes and the supply side of the business,” says Pierre. “There have been dramatic and costly events such as vast fires in Chile (2023), Greece and Siberia (2021), where 18 million hectares of forests were burned, and the Australian wildfires in 2020 and 2022, where 12.6 million hectares of both natural and commercial forests were destroyed, as well as the Californian wildfires of 2020-2021. There have also been severe wind storms in Europe. In addition, flooding and earthquakes have caused widespread devastation around the world.”
Charts courtesy of Munich RE, NatCATSERVICES.
According to a United Nations Environment Programme report from 2022 entitled Spreading Like Wildfire, “climate change and land-use change are making wildfires worse”, with a warning to anticipate “a global increase of extreme fires even in areas previously unaffected”.
Violent wind storms are amongst the most damaging natural hazards in Europe, with annual loses reaching approximately € 5 billion in the EU and UK, with the highest absolute losses experienced in Germany (€ 850 million/year), France (€ 680 million/year), Italy (€ 540 million/year) and the UK (€ 530 million/year).
“Premiums collected by any insurer will never be sufficient to cover policyholders’ claims in a year of severe natural disasters, so insurers have to hold capital to meet the obligation to pay policyholders for possible claims that may or may not materialise. This capital comes at a cost and when interest rates increase this cost of capital increases,” explains Pierre. This is what Pierre refers to as the supply side of the insurance industry. Simply put, it is the amount of insurance capacity available and both the amount and cost of such capacity is inextricably linked to global financial markets.
“After COVID, there was an almost unprecedented reduction in interest rates and capital flowed into the insurance markets,” he says. “This resulted in significant increases in the insurance capacity available which further softened the insurance cycle, leading to unsustainably low premiums. Just as the term ‘zombie firm’ refers to a company that doesn’t earn enough to cover its interest costs yet continues to operate, so the market has seen a rise in so-called zombie insurance capacity during the era of easy money. This refers to insurers extending their capacity to writing business at technically unprofitable levels and for classes that they do not normally participate in.”
However, the days of easy money are over and the sudden rise in interest rates is now reversing this trend in no small measure. “The supply side constraints would on their own have a hardening effect on insurance markets, pushing rates up in conjunction with the increasing cost of capital,” says Pierre. “But combine this with the devastating natural catastrophes of the past few years, which have resulted in massive claims costs for insurers, and we have a perfect storm playing out in the global insurance markets. Predictions are now pointing to a severe hardening in the markets, the likes of which have not been seen since 1992.”
Safire came about because of the high cost of timber insurance in South Africa in the 1980s, a situation created by the cost to global insurers of devastating fires in South America and elsewhere in the world. Timber grower Bailey Bekker, Pierre’s father, conceived the concept of a timber insurance co-operative, with individual timber growers contributing to a pool of resources shared by other low-risk timber growers.
A special feature of commercial forestry is that, compared to other crops, plantations have a significantly extended growth period, depending on the tree species, geography and timber product in question. Accordingly, the related capital is bound and the trees are exposed to various risks for an extended period of time. However, despite their long risk exposure periods, only a small percentage of the world’s forests are currently insured.
“It is impossible for an individual timber grower to completely self-insure effectively”, says Pierre. “Forestry risk is considered to be low frequency and high catastrophe in nature. Because of this, the pooling effect of insurance is vital. Many timber growers that pool their premiums together pay for the very large, severe losses of the few. This is exactly why Safire was founded and continues to serve this purpose to this day.”
Although insurance markets are facing the ‘perfect storm’ on both the supply and claims expense fronts, Pierre explains that Safire offers protection against this market volatility for the following reasons:
Relationship with reinsurers Our reinsurers have long agreed to treat our forestry pool of risk outside of the major volatility in the open markets. This has come about because of a reciprocal loyalty we have to each other that transcends hard and soft market cycles. This loyalty could only have been offered to our reinsurers on behalf of our insured members because of the loyalty of our members to supporting the pool during good and bad times.
Performance of the pool The loss performance of our pool has consistently out-performed the market and we have shown really good results for our reinsurers over an extended period of 35 years, since Safire was started in 1987. This is in no small part due to a very selective underwriting approach where only well-managed risks are allowed access to the pool.
Pierre continues, “We are not completely immune to market forces but we have serious protection against extreme volatility, which in recent years has led to no insurance capacity for some commercial timber growers in our local market.”
Insurance is based on the number and frequency of natural disasters with actual and anticipated events being considered as per actuarial science models. ”Interestingly enough, our data shows that, locally, fires are not getting worse,” says Pierre. “Plantation fires in South Africa have not necessarily been more severe or brought about higher losses since the devastating fires of 2007 and 2008 that severely affected industrial forestry plantations.”
Weather models are now predicting South Africa to be moving from a typically wet (and unusually extended) three-year La Niña cycle into a dry El Niño period with the possibility of dry weather conditions bringing about low volatility in terms of natural disasters but potentially increasing the risk of fire.
Since its beginnings as a local timber insurer supported by the prestigious Lloyds of London, Safire has expanded to provide a diverse range of short-term insurance products. The company has seen an impressive 20% growth for the past few years, and while forestry only accounts for some 10% of the business these days, growth and diversification has enabled Safire to provide even better timber insurance services on a much more sustainable basis, in addition to its wider short-term insurance offering. But Safire’s timber clients are still close to Pierre’s heart. “It’s where our roots are, and for many years we were the only true suppliers of timber insurance to the local timber growers. It’s a partnership that we value…”
Mega-fires, politics and the force of nature
Ghostly post mega-fire landscape, Southern Cape.
The number and severity of out-of-control wildfires are increasing around the world, causing untold damage to the environment, to infrastructure and the local economies, not to mention the loss of life and suffering of fire victims – both human and animal.
We all know why this is happening … climate change, prolonged dry spells followed by high winds, uncontrolled development on the urban-wildland interface, the proliferation of invasive alien plants leading to high fuel loads, changing land use patterns, poor land management, criminality, negligence and arson.
Yet we live in an environment here in southern Africa that is described as ‘fire-prone’. The natural landscapes around us actually need fire to maintain their ecological integrity. Surely we should have learned to manage these dynamics by now?
The fact of the matter is that fire is a primal force of nature that is not easily controlled, and in some instances is uncontrollable. Therefore human efforts to manage fire are always going to be caught short. Once a big fire is rampaging through a dry landscape with high fuel loads and strong winds behind it, there is no stopping it.
Our best option is to try and manage the conditions that fuel the development of uncontrollable wildfires in the first place, and to get our disaster teams organised to deal with the consequences when they do happen. This is easier said than done, requiring a level of cooperation between land owners, land managers, fire protection associations, fire authorities at all levels of government - and the weather gods – that has thus far escaped us.
Nelson Mandela University has made a huge contribution to efforts to understand and manage the dynamics that surround fire management through the development of a comprehensive Fire Management study programme and the hosting of annual Fire Management symposiums that bring together fire experts from around the country and the world.
Many of these fire experts attended the most recent 13th Fire Management Symposium held at NMU’s George Campus in November last year, thrashing out the issues, comparing notes and networking furiously. Useful, but unlikely to stop the next mega-fire. As one experienced delegate pointed out, we talk and talk but get no closer to achieving the level of collaboration required by all the fire stakeholders to actually make a difference.
Well controlled prescribed burn in the Ukhahlamba Drakensberg Park is designed to reduce fuel loads in an effort to prevent unwanted wildfires.
Perhaps the biggest disappointment is the absence at these symposiums of key government figures who could influence policy and resource allocation at national, provincial and local levels that would enable fire management stakeholders to ramp up their capacity to manage fire.
Forestry companies find themselves in the trenches at the fire-line, spending their own money to protect their plantations and processing facilities from wildfires, many of which are started outside of their boundaries. They prop up local fire protection associations, run fire awareness campaigns and put out fires they didn’t start.
This is where the rubber hits the tar.
One of the highlights of the recent Symposium was the presentation by Montigny Investments’ Risk Manager, Arno Pienaar. The Montigny team operates 80 000 ha of forest land in neighbouring Eswatini, and have implemented an old school ‘military style’ approach to keep fires out of their plantations, with considerable success. These are the same plantations that burnt to the ground in 2008, resulting in the closure of the Usutu pulp mill and the loss of hundreds of jobs. Montigny Investments is now the biggest single employer in Eswatini, and they simply cannot afford to allow another mega-fire to destroy it all again. So they have made their own plans, unconventional but effective (see full story here).
One of the keys to Montigny’s success, and this came up again and again during the symposium, was the need to get local communities on your side to prevent wildfires from happening. Properly on your side. Cut out arson fires started by angry, bored, poor, disgruntled neighbours, and half your battle is won.
This is way easier said than done, and involves a complete overhaul of the socio-economic conditions that prevail in much of southern Africa. It’s complicated, and goes way beyond the scope of the fire management fraternity.
Lessons from a mega-fire
Perhaps it would be useful to re-look at the learnings that Paul Gerber, Chief Executive Officer of the Southern Cape FPA, took from the 2017 mega-fire that turned large swaths of the Southern Cape region between George and PE to a cinder in 2017.
The Southern Cape Fire Protection Association has its hands full keeping wildfires out of this region.
• Overall there is a greater need for integrated fire management.
• Greater focus needs to be directed at awareness of the general public as well as different authorities, concerning the fire hazards that exist in the natural as well as built environment.
• Lack of financial resources: Plans for fire fighting are good but must be implementable by providing ample resources. The emphasis needs to be on being pro-active rather than reactive. A good example here is that helicopters are not deployed early enough while fires are still small and conditions are favourable, because of the high operating costs involved. They are only released when fires have assumed disastrous proportions, by which time conditions are often no longer safe for flying.
• Because of a general shortage of fire-fighting capacity and resources, more emphasis should be placed on pro-active fire prevention measures, especially controlled burns. In the well-known fire triangle, the fuel load, particularly the fine fuel component, is the only factor that can be managed and controlled. This is the factor on which all involved in fire prevention should concentrate.
• The use of media in informing and warning people was not effective. In the recent fire there was a lack of communication with the public/residents, as well as among fire fighting crews during the operations. The need for an independent, dedicated two-way radio communication system during disasters was identified, as communications via existing radio and cell-phone networks proved to be ineffective at times.
• Tactical and operational planning for the combatting of wildfires of this size should rely heavily on local experience and knowledge. With the introduction of authorities from elsewhere to take command, it was found that advice from local fire experts was disregarded.
• All spheres of government involved in fire disasters need to be trained in the incident command system.
• Divisional supervisors (‘fire bosses’) need to be well trained. At the Knysna fire there were not enough qualified fire bosses. Such supervisors need to undergo organised training courses. In the recent fire five FPA managers had to be made available to act as divisional supervisors.
• The need for fire fighting personnel experienced in veld fires who know how to make back-burns, was identified. The holiday resort of Buffalo Bay and the Fairview forest village were saved from being destroyed by judicious back-burns by foresters. It must be noted that some authorities would not give permission for such operations to be conducted.
• In the urban-rural interface, many houses built amongst natural vegetation burnt down. This practice must be reviewed and buildings need defendable space around them in the case of wildfires.
Here are some take-outs from the 13th Fire Management Symposium:-
A common thread of wildfires around the world … droughts followed by heat waves with temps above 40 degrees C and strong winds - Greg Forsyth, CSIR
Symposium presenters fielding questions from the floor (left to right) Ian Pienaar (Montigny), Trevor Abrahams (WoF), Paul Gerber (Southern Cape FPA) and Pam Booth (Knysna Municipality).
10 000 ha burnt in five hours. Final size of the fire: 189 000 ha. Flame lengths: 300 metres - Rodeo-Chediski fire, Arizona, 2002.
When it rains a lot in dry parts of South Africa, beware the following year the risk of wildfires increases - Greg Forsyth, CSIR
Building regulations should take fire risk into account – Greg Forsyth.
More accurate, balanced and informed reporting on fire is needed in SA – Lee Raath Brownie, Fire & Rescue International.
Fires are a people problem – Arno Pienaar, Montigny.
We need 17 000 wildland fire fighters in SA. We have 5 300 – Trevor Abrahams, Working on Fire.
One of the successes of the WoF programme are the many people who come through the programme and move into positions of employment. 60% of WoF managers are former WoF firefighters – Trevor Abrahams.
Working on Fire is a government job creation initiative that trains and deploys young fire fighters who assist landowners in times of need.
We talk and don’t implement. We are still doing it – Paul Gerber, Southern Cape FPA.
The Knysna fire was reported two months before it turned into a big fire. It was left to smoulder – Paul Gerber.
Fire is part of the African landscape. If you exclude it, it will lead to higher fuel loads and ultimately bigger fires – Piet van der Merwe, WoF.
Fires grow exponentially after ignition. The quicker you can get to it, the smaller is the fire and the easier it is to put out. – Piet van der Merwe.
We need to figure out how to capacitate FPAs … almost all of them are dependent on private sector funding – Val Charlton, Land Works.
Integrated fire prevention is a leadership problem more than a funding problem … there is an absence of political leadership and support – Etienne du Toit, Western Cape Government
Fuel load influences all the pillars of your fire management strategy – Deon Greyling, Mondi.
Big fires change the ecology of a landscape – Dr Rachel Loehman, US Geological Survey.
Pine and fynbos are highly flammable and fire prone – Dr Annelise Schutte-Vlok, Cape Nature.
Fire frequency is lower in small and medium grower plantations – Jeffrey le Roux, Sappi.
Everything that happens on the surface of the earth affects the groundwater, which provides 30% of the world’s fresh water. All pollution percolates down into the groundwater. So wildfires and groundwater are intimately linked – Dr Jo Barnes.
The ‘bakkie sakkie’ is the basic equipment that helps foresters keep wildfires out of their plantations.Rehabilitation work on the go to prevent soil erosion near Knysna after the 2017 inferno.Stihl knapsacks, blowers and chainsaws on display at the symposium.Timber salvaged by PG Bison after the 2017 Knysna fires is stacked in a massive wet deck that at its height was 3 km long, 24 metres wide and 4.5 metres high. (Photo courtesy Roger Parsons and Ritchie Morris)Fighting fires is dangerous work … you need the right gear.Tiaan Pool, Head of the Forestry, Wood Technology and Veldfire Management Department at Nelson Mandela University, is the driving force behind the Fire Symposiums held at the NMU George campus.
How the Montigny team keep unwanted fire out of their Eswatini plantations …
A return to sound forestry practices of the past coupled with the introduction of a military-style approach to fire management at Montigny Investments forests in Eswatini has had a big impact in reducing the number and severity of wildfires experienced in the company’s plantations. Key factors in the turnaround include improved community relations, a zero tolerance approach to arson and crime, well trained and drilled ground-based fire teams and astute use of tried and tested ‘old fashioned’ fire prevention methods coupled with modern technology.
Commercial tree plantations in Eswatini – particularly the Usutu plantation - have a history of fire, due to a combination of rugged, mountainous terrain, extreme weather events and a proliferation of arson fires.
Massive fires in 2007/8 destroyed large swaths of the Usutu pine plantation (then owned by Sappi) resulting in the eventual closure of the Usutu pulp mill and the loss of hundreds of jobs.
Montigny Investments, a Swazi owned and operated, integrated timber business, purchased the Usutu forests in 2014, bringing their total land holding to 80 000 ha of which 50 000 ha is planted. The Montigny team is renowned for its innovative and highly practical approach to business, and this approach was applied to the development of a fire prevention strategy that is designed to keep their plantations safe from massive fires such as the one that destroyed Usutu in 2007.
Aerial view of Montigny timber processing facility, Eswatini. Montigny processes more than one million tons of timber a year.
According to Montigny Forestry Manager Jurgens Kritzinger, they looked at the history of fires in the plantations that they operate, and discovered that in the old days there were fewer fires, less damage, better roads, good relationships with neighbouring communities and own operations. As time went by the ownership changes at Usutu led to outsourcing of operations, unhappy people and more arson fires.
The Montigny team turned the ship around by going back to some of the best practices that worked well in the past, re-introduced own ops using their own people and own equipment, put huge emphasis on building community relationships, invested in improved roads, planted dynamic wattle belts and employed a military expert to help them adopt a military-style approach to fire prevention.
Arno Pienaar was serving with a security company in Iraq when he was head hunted by Montigny to head up their fire and risk management function in 2015. Surprisingly, at the time of his appointment Arno had zero forestry experience and zero fire management experience. But the Montigny management were confident they had enough people with forestry and plantation fire experience already – what they needed was Arno’s military expertise.
Arno Pienaar … Montigny Group Risk Manager, presenting at the13th Fire Management Symposium at Nelson Mandela University’s George Campus, South Africa.
In 2015, the Montigny approach to fire management was introduced, with immediate results. That year the company suffered damage to just 18.4 hectares of plantation as a result of wildfire. Prior to that, average annual fire damage was 1 000 hectares. There was also a marked decline in the number of arson fires recorded.
This was not just a flash in the pan, a lucky break! The ever improving fire stats have been sustained to the present day, and speak for themselves:-
YEAR
HECTARES DAMAGED BY FIRE
ARSON FIRES
2014
606 ha
–
2015 (new system introduced)
18.4 ha
19
2016
74.8 ha
11
2017
0
6
2018
45 ha
5
2019
590 ha
6
2020
4.3 ha
1
2021
145 ha
8
2022
2.9 ha
5
Arno provided some insights into the Montigny approach to fire prevention at the 13th Fire Management Symposium held at Nelson Mandela University’s George campus in November 2022.
Fighting fires is a bit like fighting a battle, he said. Success depends upon clear objectives, good preparation and intelligence, the availability of well trained personnel on the ground, the right tools and plenty of ammunition.
All the elements of fire management were carefully analysed in the process of developing a comprehensive strategy that left no stone unturned: fuel load management and fire break preparation, fire detection, reaction, suppression, command and control at the fire front and in the control room, mop up and patrols.
Good intelligence is crucial, explained Arno. Know all the relevant facts.
Reducing the number of arson fires was a key priority. They analysed where arson fires were started, what time of the day (or night) they occur, the phase of the moon. People are predictable and criminal activities follow a pattern – understand the patterns and your counter measures will be more accurate, he said.
Manual harvesting and tractor-trailer short haul at Montigny South, Eswatini, maximises jobs from forestry operations. The Montigny Group employs 11 600 people making it one of the biggest employers in Eswatini.
Getting the community on side
Getting the community on their side was a key part of the strategy. Montigny is renowned for their community programmes. They have established an entire village at Bulembu that looks after over 350 orphaned and vulnerable kids, just one of a number of community projects which provide a good foundation upon which to build community relations.
A dedicated K9 team that breeds and trains bloodhounds to track and find anyone engaging in criminal activity on Montigny property has proved to be an extremely effective deterrent to crime and arson, but has also helped get the community on their side. Most of the K9 missions currently undertaken are in fact solving crimes against the communities living in and around Montigny plantations. Crime doesn’t only affect the forestry company – it also affects the communities deeply, and safety and security is high up on their priority of needs.
Now the criminals know that they are not going to get away with it, says Arno. Even if they don’t secure a conviction, the criminals are pointed out and the community knows who the trouble-makers are – they are the same people who start arson fires. Even the police frequently request assistance from the Montigny K9 team. Thus the community has become an ally and a valuable source of intelligence. So much so that the community stepped up and helped the Montigny team protect the plantation during the unrest that swept across Eswatini in 2021.
They also changed the rules around not allowing employees to give people lifts in company vehicles inside the plantations. A small thing, but the spinoff is significant.
“How can you drive past somebody in your company bakkie with Montigny signage on the side who has to walk 10 kilometres to the nearest bus stop, and expect them to support you?” asked Arno.
It’s this kind of thinking that changes mind-sets.
“The people on the ground realise that we are there to help them – not just to make money for ourselves,” said Arno.
Montigny forestry creates local jobs and utilises a network of subcontractors for timber transport and other operations.
Staff selection and training
Staff selection and training is another key part of the strategy. Dedicated fire teams have very specific tasks and are drilled military-style until they are extremely fit and are experts at their job.
The Montigny team has cancelled their expensive plantation fire camera detection system and have instead established a network of old fashioned fire watch towers with 24-hour surveillance over every inch of the plantation. The tower guards report any smoke detected instantly to the control room, setting in motion a chain of action from highly trained fire-fighting teams that are geared to get to the fire front within 8 minutes.
The fire watch towers also contribute to preventing crime as the guards report any irregular or unscheduled activity in the plantation, which will be followed up and investigated by one of the 300 Montigny field rangers patrolling the plantation.
“We put out any fire that we detect within three kilometres of our boundary,” said Arno. “This is our rule, and there should be no deviation from it.”
A hard lesson was learned in 2019 when a fire was detected outside the Montigny boundary, but within the three km zone. The fire-fighting teams had been busy fighting another fire and were exhausted. Arno was instructed to leave the new fire as it was not in the path of the prevailing wind and was considered low risk. He was told that he was pushing the fire-fighting teams too hard. So he reluctantly left that fire. But the weather turned, the wind picked up and it entered the Montigny plantation and caused extensive damage. Lesson learned!
“You cannot make emotional decisions,” states Arno. The rules are the rules. No deviation.
Montigny fire team at the ready.
Fire boss training
Fire bosses were identified as a key link in the chain of command, and they receive dedicated, customised training. The Montigny team has developed a user-friendly software app that gives fire bosses instant access to critical info about fuel loads, terrain and weather at the fire site, as well as availability and location of fire-fighting teams and equipment, enabling them to make quick, informed decisions.
Arno says that in their experience aerial bombers have not been very effective, especially in the mountainous terrain as they have to drop their water from too high, so they rather rely on ground-based fire-fighting teams backed up with customised fire tenders and bakkie sakkies. Ground crews are needed to mop up after an aerial water drop in any event, so that is where they have invested their resources.
“In the military we know that the air force can give you the initiative, but it’s ground troops that will win you the war,” said Arno.
One of the biggest problems encountered by fire-fighters in rugged terrain is that they run out of water at some point, and the fire gets away while the troops are desperately trying to get more water to the fire line. Arno says this is unacceptable – you can’t afford to run out of ammunition in the middle of a battle. He saw a demonstration of a compressed air foam system and realised this could help extend the capacity of their fire-fighting units to extinguish fires. Now the Montigny fire tenders fitted with CAF systems use 10% water to 90% fire retardant foam to douse fires. This allows the water in the fire tender to last much longer, while also making the hoses lighter and easier to handle, allowing fire fighters to reach the fire front faster. He says his teams can deploy a 180 metre fire hose inside a compartment in 1.5 minutes. Speed is everything.
Using 90% fire retardant foam to 10% water turns a 7 000 litre fire tender into a 70 000 litre fire-fighting resource.
He likened the ‘chaos’ of a wildfire to the ‘chaos’ that troops experience during a gun battle.
“We broke down the 'chaos' element into small bits,” said Arno. Each element is analysed, prepared for and practiced over and over.
The Montigny team’s success in stopping wildfires quickly before they get out of control has significantly improved as a result of cool heads, good management and well trained fire-fighters.
However effective fire prevention starts long before the outbreak of an actual fire and involves every aspect of the forestry operation from budget allocation to fire break preparation, fuel load reduction and slash management, access road design and maintenance, personnel selection and training, community relations, equipment selection and availability, vigilance and readiness.
This takes a team effort and total alignment throughout the organisation with very clear objectives, concluded Arno.
Air drying timber at Montigny South, Eswatini. The Montigny team is able to extract maximum value from each and every tree that they harvest due to the diversity of markets that they supply.
‘Preparing for the next Mega Fire’ is the theme of the 13th Fire Management Symposium, scheduled to be held at the Nelson Mandela University’s (NMU) George Campus from 23 to 25 November.
Effective wildfire management is impeded by a lack of integration between research results, technological development, and efforts by fire managers. In the end all strive to prevent, suppress and protect the environment, human wellbeing, and assets against wildfire.
This event aims to integrate the efforts of natural resource managers, engineers, and scientists through an integrated approach.
The Symposium will bring together fire managers and authorities from different disciplines and land uses including nature conservation, agriculture, disaster management, forestry and local authorities, for a range of informative presentations and exciting networking opportunities.
The choice of George as a venue to host the Symposium is appropriate as it is situated in the scenic southern Cape which experienced one of the worst fires in the history of South Africa on 7 June 2017. Exactly one year later another mega fire swept through the Southern Cape, so this region knows all too well about wildfires.
The George campus is also the venue for the highly acclaimed Fire Management programme offered by NMU which equips aspirant foresters and land managers with a deeper understanding of fire dynamics and the practical application of fire risk reduction, fire management and suppression.
The Symposium brings together top rated international and South African-based fire management specialists who will share their expertise in a very practical and applied manner. Internationally renowned fire scientist Prof Pete Fule will deliver the first keynote address.
The 2nd day of the event is a field day that will provide opportunities for Symposium participants to visit the Southern Cape region to observe the unique vegetation and take note of fire related issues - hosted by the Southern Cape Fire Protection Association.
For more information contact tiaan.pool@mandela.ac.za or Hannes.vanZyl@mandela.ac.za or sonia.roets@mandela.ac.za.
Discovering the cause and origin of a destructive wildfire
Fire expert Dave Dobson was hired to find the cause and origin of a wildfire that left a swathe of destruction across farms and forestry plantations in the KZN midlands in 2007. Working years after the event, Dave followed the trail of smoke to uncover the origin of the runaway fire that burnt thousands of hectares to a cinder …
The dispute surrounding the ‘Kentucky’ fire of 25th June 2007 that devastated farms and commercial forests in the Curry’s Post area of KwaZulu-Natal has eventually been settled. The fire caused extensive damage to privately owned farms and commercial forest plantations in the area.
As a result of the fire one of the plantation owners instituted legal proceedings against the owners of two properties where the fire was purported to have originated. This case study deals with the case against the second Defendant, the owner of the farm Kentucky.
The challenges The objective of every fire investigation is to establish the cause and origin of the fire and to determine the ignition sequence.
The first challenge, and one that is regularly encountered in work of this nature, is the fact that I was appointed to investigate the origin and spread of this fire on behalf of the Defendant some seven years after the event (i.e. in 2014).
The Defendant was not a member of the local Fire Protection Association. This raised two issues. The first was that the Defendant was deemed negligent in the event of a fire originating or exiting his property and the onus rested on the Defendant then to prove his innocence. The second issue was that the Defendant was denied access to information held by members of the Fire Protection Association. This was particularly important in respect of the origin of the fire under investigation.
Other issues that contributed to the charge of negligence against the Defendant related to the presence of a compartment of plantation waste/slash located on the boundary between the Defendant’s farm and a neighbouring commercial forest plantation. This was deemed to be a fire risk which contributed to a massive flare-up that resulted in the fire spreading to the Plaintiff’s plantations.
The fires A number of fires occurred during this period. The first two occurred on the property adjoining Kentucky Farm (St Clair Estate) while the third, as will be shown later, arose on Kentucky Farm. This led unfortunately to the fire becoming known colloquially as ‘the Kentucky Fire’ which was not entirely correct!
The first fire (fire A) occurred on Sunday 24 June 2007. It was extinguished on St Clair Estate (Kentucky’s neighbour) and played no further role in the events that unfolded the following day.
The second fire (fire B) started on the morning of Monday 25 June 2007 on St Clair Estate and swept through Kentucky Farm fanned by extreme weather conditions.
A third fire (fire C), that was not reported, started on Kentucky Farm during the afternoon of Monday 25 June 2007. This is the fire that resulted in the extensive damage to commercial plantations and farms in the area, which was the focus of this lawsuit.
Data collection I approached the investigation in a systematic manner beginning with a site visit and an interview with the Defendant. This proved useful in providing circumstantial evidence tracing the progress of the fire through the Defendant’s property. Of particular importance however, was acquainting myself with the overall fire area which was to prove beneficial later in the investigation.
Empirical data was collected in the form of weather data during the time of the fire, interviews and fire reports from various parties who were involved in fighting the fire as well as photographs taken from the spotter aircraft monitoring the fire. A vital piece of evidence was pictures taken of the origin and spread of the fire recorded by Fire Hawk’s locally based fire tower. This information was not readily available to the Defendant since he was not a member of the local Fire Protection Association. However, the picture sequence of the fire was in the public domain as it was being used to conduct Fire Boss Training courses. A simple request for the pictures provided access to this vital piece of information!
In addition, and rather late in the day, an Expert Report was received from the Plaintiff’s legal team.
Cause and origin of the fire Once the data had been collected and analysed it was possible to develop a hypothesis of the events that occurred on this day. This hypothesis was then subjected to systems analysis to develop a broad understanding of what happened and to avoid linear thinking. This initial hypothesis is depicted in the following diagramme.
In developing this initial hypothesis consideration was given to the summons which suggested that the fire originated from the Sunday night fire (fire A) that had – according to the summons - not been properly extinguished. Various witness statements however refuted this contention. Furthermore, picture evidence obtained from the Fire Hawk camera appeared to indicate that the fire that damaged the Plaintiff’s plantations originated near some homes on the neighbouring St Claire Estate and was the result of a member of the household throwing out ash from the previous night’s hearth fire during the morning of Monday 25 June (fire B).
When examining a problem systematically there are tools in systems thinking that can assist with an enquiry. Systems archetypes are one such tool. As one works with the problem, developing the story, identifying the key variables and sketching them in causal loop diagrams, patterns begin to emerge which provide keys to unlocking parts of the problem. These generic patterns are described in systems thinking as archetypes (Kim, D., H. and Anderson, V. 1998).
A typical “Escalation” archetype now emerges where discarded ash from a previous night’s fire catches alight and starts a fire (fire B). This fire later enters the plantation slash on Kentucky and under deteriorating weather conditions escapes causing havoc to farms and commercial forest plantations down wind. This served as an initial hypothesis for testing against further empirical evidence.
The crucial evidence related to the slash in an old pine compartment located on Kentucky Farm, adjacent to the boundary between Kentucky farm and a neighbouring commercial forestry estate. The trees in this compartment had been clearfelled six years prior to the fire and most of the plantation residue would have decomposed by the time of the fire. Nevertheless the Plaintiff’s Expert presented pictures showing clear lines of fire burning in the old pine compartment which were ascribed to the brush piles having caught alight. The picture also clearly showed a road in the area.
I was aware that no such road existed and began searching for an answer to this conundrum. It turned out that the fire depicted in the photographs was actually burning on a property on the other side of the Curry’s Post road some 1.5 km away! The owner of the property was contacted and confirmation was received that he had in fact cleared and stacked jungle wattle and gum in this area of his farm a few months prior to the fire! The picture of the plantation slash burning that was presented as evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendant was incorrect – the photos were of another property on the other side of the Curry’s Post road.
Brush burning 1.5 km away from the Kentucky fire.
It was time to test the validity of the evidence of the fire entering and escaping from the old pine compartment on Kentucky Farm.
A closer inspection of the photographic evidence of the fire in the section of Kentucky farm bordering the commercial forest revealed further interesting empirical data. The first was clear evidence – i.e. straight line burns - of firebreak burning in kikuyu camps adjacent to the old pine compartment on Kentucky. Wild fires do not burn in straight lines. From the available photographs it was evident that the party responsible for initiating this firebreak burn lost control of the operation resulting in it entering the old pine slash compartment on Kentucky farm, and subsequently the neighbouring forest where it was brought under control by the land owner. However, the fire in the old pine slash compartment on Kentucky continued to burn. This was fire C.
Unburnt Kikuyu camps on Kentucky Farm. Fire heading to the Kentucky homestead.
The events leading to the origin of this fire were never reported, although mention was made in a fire report of drip torches being issued to a helitack ground crew who were dropped in the area in an effort to mop up and contain the fire.
Soon after this, evidence of the fire break between Kentucky and the commercial forest plantation being half burnt indicated a further attempt to contain the fire. The Expert for the Plaintiff (who had previously been contracted by Kentucky’s neighbour to prepare a report on the fire) mentioned the “application of a counter fire along the land owner’s boundary closing up to the main plantation road.”
Clearly there were numerous attempts to introduce counter fires and fire-breaks along this boundary under extreme weather conditions.
At the same time as fire C was burning in the old pine compartment on Kentucky farm, a power failure at the landing strip where the water bombers were refuelling delayed their return to the fire. A further complication arose when weather conditions became too dangerous to fly. Eventually the fire exited the old pine compartment and was driven, out of control, by the extreme weather conditions across many farms before entering the Plaintiff’s commercial pine plantations where extensive damage was experienced.
Final hypothesis It now becomes possible to develop a final hypothesis describing the fire. This hypothesis is summarised in the diagramme that follows.
Initially as mentioned a preliminary hypothesis was considered which was represented by an “Escalating” archetype: Discarded ash catching alight and resulting in the fire spreading onto Kentucky Farm from whence it enters the slash in the old pine compartment and later spreads to neighbouring farms and forest plantations (fire B).
However, on further investigation a second archetype emerged – a ‘Fixes that Fail’ archetype where an unintended consequence of the use of counter fires or fire-breaks set in an effort to contain fire B, results in the fire escaping and entering the old pine compartment on Kentucky farm from whence, after a delay (indicated by the parallel lines) the fire enters farms and commercial forests causing immense damage (fire C).
An interesting addition to the overall picture is the loop linking Curry’s Post road to the main fire. Pictures of the windrowed plantation slash on a property some 1.5 km away from the Defendant’s farm across the Curry’s Post road from the Defendant was presented as evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendant. This was shown as being clearly incorrect!
Results After careful consideration of the evidence and interviews with people involved it became clear that the Defendant did not act negligently. The unintended consequence of trying to “fix” the problem of fire B exiting Kentucky by burning counter fires and fire-breaks on the Defendant’s property is the probable cause of the subsequent damage to farms and forests downwind of Kentucky. This counter fire activity was never reported.
The evidence presented of the extreme fire danger posed by the plantation slash on Kentucky plus the photographic evidence of windrowed slash burning in support of this claim was refuted. In the end the Plaintiff’s summons was deemed to have no substance and was subsequently withdrawn. The Plaintiff ended up having to pay the Defendant the cost of suit.
References KIM, D., H., ANDERSON, V. 1998. Systems Archetypes Basics. From Story to Structure. Waltham Massachusetts, Pegasus Communications Inc.
New association for wildland firefighters launched
A new association for Wildland Firefighters has been launched in South Africa. The Association for Wildland Firefighters (AWF) represents the wildland firefighting industry and associated professionals in Southern Africa.
“Numerous investigations into some disastrous fires in Southern Africa highlighted the need for a formal body to represent the needs of the wildland firefighter. The AWF aims to develop the knowledge, skills, understanding and competence of wildland firefighting in South Africa,” says Etienne Du Toit, the chairperson of the AWF.
Du Toit says the organization aims to improve the standards of safety and the working environment for firefighters in the sector in which its members operate.
The Association is registered as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. Any person or organisation associated with the wildland firefighting/integrated fire management fraternity qualifies to be members.
Du Toit says that climate change has resulted in a significant increase in wildfire risk, not only to responders but also to civilians.
“Monetary losses and other damages as result of these fires annually exceeds hundreds of millions. More needs to be done to address these risks. This is where the AWF comes in, an organisation that aims to share learning in such a manner that it promotes professionalism, reduces responder and civilian risk and at the same time allows for continuous improvement in all aspects of integrated wildfire management.”
The new association specifically addresses the needs of the wildfire fraternity.
“Until now, no other association specifically addressed the needs of the wildfire fraternity, there are similar associations but these are more focused on the structural firefighting sector,” says Du Toit.
The founders of the organisation come from a variety of backgrounds, including the fire service, forestry and conservation sectors and include business development practitioners with vast practical experience in these sectors.
“This Association seeks to enhance synergies between the various entities responsible for wildfire and integrated fire management, and one of the main aims is to professionalise the wildfire fighting industry in SA,” he said.
For more info contact Tessa Oliver at email: info@wildlandfire.org.za
Preventing fires, planting trees & locking up carbon
Planting indigenous tree saplings at Platbos.
A partnership between Fogmaker South Africa and the Platbos Conservation Trust is contributing to the reforestation of the unique Platbos indigenous forest in the Western Cape. What these two very different organisations have in common is a desire to prevent unwanted fires, and a deep concern for the environment.
Platbos, situated between Gansbaai and Hermanus, is Africa’s southern-most indigenous forest. Surrounded by fynbos, cultivated lands and encroaching alien invasive jungles, this unique, ancient forest is under threat and needs active management to survive.
Although it is situated in a fire shadow area, wildfires have over the years been encroaching on the forest margins and threatening this sensitive ecosystem which is rich in biodiversity and contains many ancient trees, some over 1 000 years old.
The Platbos Forest Reforestation Project is an NPO that aims to expand and strengthen the forest by removing alien invasive vegetation from the forest margins and planting indigenous trees that are endemic to the area. This crucial work serves to protect the heart of the forest from encroaching wildfires, promotes biodiversity and sequesters carbon to counter global warming.
Fogmaker South Africa decided to get behind this initiative by donating a tree for every Fogmaker fire suppression system that they install in forestry machines during 2021.
These trees are grown in the Platbos tree nursery before they are planted out in selected areas around the Platbos forest. The Platbos reforestation team follows up, watering the young saplings and doing general vegetation maintenance to ensure their survival
The Fogmaker connection Fogmaker SA are the licenced distributors and installers of Fogmaker fire suppression systems across Southern Africa.
Fogmaker automatic fire suppression systems are manufactured by Fogmaker International in Sweden. The systems are designed specifically to protect engine compartments of mobile equipment – including forestry equipment – to prevent engine fires that have the potential to destroy expensive equipment, injure the operators, interrupt work schedules and set fire to surrounding vegetation including plantations.
Fogmaker systems attack all three elements of the fire triangle.
Fogmaker systems attack all three sides of the fire triangle: oxygen, heat and fuel. When triggered by an engine fire the Fogmaker system produces a fine water mist. This water mist vapourises and expands when it comes into contact with any heat source and displaces the oxygen needed to sustain a fire. The water mist, containing a foam additive, discharges for more than 60 seconds and cools down hot surfaces, while forming a protective barrier on the surface of any flammable material, including fuel, to prevent re-ignition.
Fogmaker systems have been installed on a wide range of forestry equipment including harvesters, mulchers, chippers, forwarders and loggers, produced by leading suppliers like Hitachi, Tigercat, TimberPro, CAT, Bell and Pinoth.
See how the Fogmaker system extinguishes a simulated engine fire in seconds...
Forestry machine protected by Fogmaker system.
Fogmaker fire suppression system installed in a John Deere feller buncher.
Hard-working forestry machines are always at risk of fire due to the fact that the fine vegetative material (leaves and sticks) that tend to get caught up in the engine compartments have the potential to catch fire due to extreme heat. The risk is increased as the dry, winter fire season approaches in the summer rainfall areas of South Africa.
Fogmaker SA’s innovative CSI programme aims to support the cause of preventing unwanted wildfires, but also to contribute to the reduction of carbon emissions which are contributing to global warming and climate change.
Since 2008, the Platbos Reforestation Project team has planted some 89 000 trees, with help from organisations such as Fogmaker, thus making a huge contribution to sequestering carbon.
The Fogmaker tree planting team with Platbos director Francois Krige (extreme left).
Planting young trees to expand and protect the Platbos natural forest.
Last year Fogmaker supported the African Honey Bee Project by donating a bee hive for several Fogmaker systems installed in customers’ forestry machines. This is an innovative project that promotes bee farming and honey production among rural communities. It includes training in responsible bee keeping, in particular how to smoke out bee hives without setting fire to the surrounding vegetation. This is a frequent source of wildfires in forestry plantations around SA.
Paraquat - widely used in South African forestry to prepare tracer belts before burning firebreaks - is facing world-wide bans, forcing foresters to reach for the old-fashioned hoe. GAYNOR LAWSON reports.
It sounds so benign: “A non-selective herbicide - an aqueous solution contact herbicide for the control of annual grasses and annual broadleaf weeds in crops as listed and as a sugarcane desiccant. Inactivated on contact with the soil.” But this listed herbicide that contains Paraquat, “could have killed 2000 people” when maliciously used by a disgruntled employee to poison a tank of milk in the Cape in 2017, according to a News24 article. It is highly toxic.
Locally, Paraquat is extensively used to create tracer-belts as part of a fire management programme to prevent fires running out of control during the burning of firebreaks. The herbicide creates a boundary area devoid of vegetation before burning takes place. It is considered cost-effective, efficient and useful as it only desiccates the above-ground part of the vegetation (it leaves the root stock below ground unharmed), allowing for regeneration with the rainy season and thus preventing erosion or invasion by alien plants.
First produced for commercial purposes in 1961, Paraquat remains one of the world’s most commonly used herbicides, despite its potentially lethal impact on humans, either through deliberate poisoning or simply by working irresponsibly with it. It may be airborne when applied as a fine spray and can be spread through contact with clothing so it requires special training to ensure safe handling by users.
China reportedly experiences 5,000 deaths from Paraquat poisoning annually, although whether this is through accidental or deliberate poisoning is unconfirmed - Paraquat is known to be used in suicide attempts. It reputedly doubles the risk of Parkinson’s disease in those who come into contact with it, and the Michael J Fox Foundation issued an anti-Paraquat appeal on its website in October last year (the popular actor’s much-publicised battle with Parkinson’s has brought about heightened awareness of the disease): “Take action today to ban Paraquat. Your support can help protect people from environmental exposure to a known pesticide that increases the risk of Parkinson’s disease. We need your help to educate your Senators and Representatives…”
The appeal was posted in response to the reapproval by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of several pesticides (including Paraquat) for use in the United States. The EPA reviews all herbicides and pesticides every 15 years to confirm they are safe for use, based on “assessments of human and environmental impact”. Despite its “well-documented harms”, the use of Paraquat in the United States “is at an all-time high, and it is one of only two pesticides still used in the United States that is either banned or being phased out in the European Union, China and Brazil”, according to the website.
Measures have indeed been put in place to control its availability. It cannot be bought or used in the UK (although, ironically, it is legally manufactured there), Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and the European Union (where it has been banned since 2007). It has been banned in Switzerland since 1989 because it is deemed too dangerous for use even when wearing protective clothing and equipment. In the USA, only commercially licensed users have access to it.
A complete international ban is apparently blocked by the US and developing nations whenever this is proposed. According to an article, “Poison on a plate”, which appeared in The Daily Maverick on 26 January this year, “It’s a shocking display of global north hypocrisy, allowing dangerous agrochemical companies to flood low- and middle-income countries for the financial gain and profit of European nations.”
The situation in South Africa In South Africa, plantations certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) may not use Paraquat in any formulation that is available on the market. Gerrit Marais of the FSC Southern Africa Office, says: “Paraquat has been on the FSC Highly Hazardous list since the first pesticide policy was published way back in 2006. The figure below provides information on the reasons why this is done i.e., acute toxicity. Use of the product is thus not limited but prohibited unless it is approved, via a formal FSC process, for temporary emergency use. The South African forestry industry used to have a special derogation (exemption) for the use of this active ingredient and product, but this expired in 2020…Traditionally, the only alternative (to Paraquat) was to hoe the tracers by hand. This is, however, not ideal from an environmental perspective as hoeing often leads to erosion and thus this option – especially on steep slopes - is most undesirable. Some certificate holders have used other systemic herbicides (such as Glyphosate), but here too, the entire plant is killed and the risk of erosion is increased. The South African forestry industry is looking at other options…”
The stance of the Sustainable African Forest Assurance Scheme (SAFAS) – which has been endorsed by the other global certification body, PEFC - is that Paraquat can be used for tracer belt preparation, providing strict control/mitigation measures are in place. Steven Germishuizen, SAFAS general manager, says: “SAFAS supports the use of Paraquat from an environmental perspective because it is the best solution for fire management in grasslands. However, we acknowledge that it is highly toxic, so in accordance with our risk-based approach, we insist on strict precautions as far as training, use of PPE and application methods go.”
Craig Norris, NCT Forest Technology Manager, adds: “In addition to what Steve has said, we encourage an integrated approach to chemical use. In other words, the use of agrochemicals is the last choice of action and must be defendable. Agrochemicals can be detrimental to human and environmental health and will only be used after due consideration is given to other options/mitigation measures: • Chemical control must be used in combination with above methods to minimise quantities used. • Strategy for reduction of chemical use must be implemented. • Chemical label specifications must be followed. • Recommended safety, training, application procedures must be adhered to.
Steven comments: “We also encourage the use of technology, such as drones, to keep people away from the chemical. We strongly encourage exploration into environmentally suitable alternatives that are less toxic.” There is some experimentation with drone spraying currently underway in an attempt to cut humans out of the Paraquat-handling process almost completely.
What is the history behind Paraquat use in SA? According to Dr John Scotcher of ForestLore Consulting in a report written for the FSC in 2014: “Burning green grass is not possible and, in any event, adversely affects biodiversity. In order to improve the safety aspects of burning firebreaks, a system of fire tracer lines was introduced which entailed the hoeing or ploughing of two parallel strips of vegetation approximately one metre wide (the fire tracer line) and 30 metres apart during the late summer to early autumn. These tracer lines are now devoid of vegetation and are used as lines from which to burn the intervening 30 metres (the firebreak) during winter when the grass is dry.”
The report continues: “Approximately 30 years ago, the use of chemicals was introduced as an approach that could be used where mechanical methods such as hoeing, ploughing or use of a brush-cutter was impractical and dangerous to use … normally on steep and mountainous terrain. Paraquat was first used in South Africa in 1982 by the nature conservation agencies responsible for the management of high-altitude grasslands in the uKhahlamba-Drakensberg Park, which is a registered World Heritage Site. The use of Paraquat in this mountainous region enabled the elimination of the historic use of hoed or ploughed tracer lines that resulted in soil loss and scars across the landscape, which even after 100 years are still visible to this day. Paraquat was soon adopted by the agriculture and forestry industry. Paraquat was ideal for use in conservation areas and later in no-till systems such as forestry and grazing lands since it only affects the foliage part of the sprayed plants, thus promoting intact root systems and preventing soil erosion. It also does not leach into groundwater since it is absorbed into clay particles and neutralised when it comes into contact with the soil … In the forestry industry, the use of Paraquat was seen as a best management practice because there was no need to continue with the damaging practice of hoeing or ploughing.”
The Forestry South Africa Environmental Guidelines for Commercial Plantations in South Africa (Version 4 2020, chapter 4) proposes the following approach to the preparation of firebreaks:
Mowing
Slashing
Burning
Desiccant chemicals (Paraquat) – on slopes greater than 20 per cent
Manual hoeing – now discontinued
Mechanical methods (ploughing) – now discontinued
The Wildland Fire Management Handbook for sub-Saharan Africa provides detailed advice on fire protection and advocates the use of ‘chemical surface sprays’ for the preparation of tracer lines i.e. Paraquat.
Paraquat may still be used by the man in the street, although a global shortage because of it being discontinued in many countries has sent prices rocketing. Is there an alternative?
Roger Poole, chairman of the Timber Industry Pesticide Working Group or TIPWG, says: “The forestry industry in collaboration with Professor Keith Little of Nelson Mandela University (NMU) has been researching and testing alternatives for the past nine years since the FSC first indicated that Paraquat would be prohibited. One alternative, pelargonic acid, has shown results similar to Paraquat as a desiccant and was heading for registration under Act 36 of 1947. Unfortunately, the manufacturer was involved with a company buy-out and the new owners changed the formulation of the original product that had been tested. Bridging trials were done to compare the new formulation to the original pelargonic acid; sadly the new formulation did not show favourable results and could not be registered. Glufosinate-ammonium is an active ingredient that is used in agriculture, classed as a partly systemic contact herbicide that is an alternative for tracer preparation - but supervision is imperative as over-application could result in it being more systemic than contact and grass root systems could be severely damaged. TIPWG has stated that Glyphosate formulations should not be used for tracer preparation as this active ingredient could result in a complete kill and thus erosion will occur, especially on steep terrain.”
Dr Scotcher adds in another factor - the human element of the spraying process: “When terrain is steep, the person spraying naturally slows down to navigate safely up or down the hillside, resulting in a higher application rate per unit area.”
Dr Gerhard Verdoorn, Operations and Stewardship Manager for CropLife SA, comments: “There is currently no herbicide with the properties of Paraquat apart from diquat which is also a bipyridinium compound with high toxicity. It is not registered for the purposes of industrial vegetation management like Paraquat is. A possibility is pelargonic acid but the dosage rates required to desiccate plants is much higher than what was originally anticipated and that makes it a very costly option. Furthermore, it is not registered in South Africa. Attempts with many other herbicides have all failed to emulate the effects of Paraquat. Glyphosate is registered for such purposes as making firebreaks but due to its systemicity, it kills plants completely which leads to terrible erosion.”
When asked about the slower progress of workers on steep slopes leading to over-application, he disagrees, saying: “Glyphosate is super-systemic and even with a low dosage (lower than label directions) it will kill plants completely, especially broad-leaved plants. Some of the tough monocotyledons like Cynodon will survive but most of the softer grass species are wiped out completely. Another issue is the problem of resistance development when sub-optimal dosages of Glyphosate are used for chemical mowing; although it is on labels of some Glyphosate-containing herbicides, it is the best catalyst for resistance development I have ever heard of and the crop sector is currently battling with Glyphosate resistance (Amaranthus palmeri, Amaranthus hybridus, Conyza bonariensis, etc).”
A desiccated tracer break ready for burning.
Is a total ban an over-reaction? “People are very quick to point fingers at the use of pesticides but are sadly ignorant of potentially toxic products they use daily at home and, which, if used incorrectly, can be fatal,” says Roger Poole. “Everyone loves coffee, but do they know that the caffeine in coffee's LD50 is 150-200 mg/kg?” {LD50 is the amount of a substance, given all at once, that causes the death of 50% of a group of test subjects; it is a way of determining the short-term poisoning potential or acute toxicity of a substance}.
“So why has no one died from coffee? Simply put, the risk of consuming lethal quantities in your morning cup of java is not possible so the risk of poisoning is reduced. Consider household cleaning detergents, has anyone ever read the label or safety data sheet of the detergents they have in their home? Are these locked away so the uninformed cannot access them? Are certain products kept separately so that they cannot react with each other? Bleach is one of the most commonly used products found in households throughout South Africa, but did you know that if bleach and vinegar come into contact with each other their reaction can cause chlorine gas? Whatever product you are using at home or in the workplace, be it a pesticide or a detergent, they can all be toxic if used or applied incorrectly.” His message is loud and clear - use Paraquat correctly to minimise potential risks!
Is a total ban on Paraquat likely in the near future? The Rotterdam Convention is scheduled to take place this year, although with the global COVID-19 pandemic, whether it goes ahead is uncertain. Poole says: “Paraquat is one of the many listed active ingredients for consideration to be banned worldwide and has been listed numerous times but never seems to be banned due to pressure from the large world economies. We wait in anticipation for the outcome, as we've done in the past.”
A year later on… It’s a year since an article entitled 'Weaning the forestry industry from its paraquat reliance' by Jacqui Meyer appeared in SA Forestry magazine. According to the article, “the next step is applying for an Emergency Registration under Act 36 of 1947, which Dr Gerhard Verdoorn of CropLife SA is currently assisting TIPWG with. With CropLife’s support and the information obtained from the bridging trials, we hope to have pelargonic acid available for the 2021 summer rainfall area fire season.”
Well, that was in March 2020, and in April 2021, Dr Verdoorn was doubtful about the predictions - for this fire season at least. “I am not sure this is going to materialise… if we are able to get our hands on pelargonic acid. It is quite expensive … and I wonder if it will make the grade for the timber industry.”
In the meantime, creating tracer belts using mechanical methods such as brush-cutters and tractor-operated grass-slashers is the norm, with some landowners and companies using Glufosinate-ammonium. “It’s been very difficult, with manual clearing and a return to traditional hoeing on flat terrain,” says Simon Thomas, Operations Manager for KZN FPA. So, what will the situation be by next year’s fire season? Is a total switch to drone-spraying a feasible option? Only time will tell.
Despite the fact that sawdust piles are fire hazards, they are very unlikely to spontaneously combust as a result of heat build-up as the composting process of pure sawdust is too slow. This argument was accepted by the judge in a court case in which a sawmiller was sued by a neighbouring landowner who claimed that a sawdust pile spontaneously combusted, causing a fire that damaged his plantation. DAVE DOBSON reports …
Background This case study deals with allegations of spontaneous combustion in sawdust heaps on the Defendant’s property that resulted in a fire that devastated a neighbouring commercial pine plantation.
The Client The client was the Defendant in this case; the owner of a property on which eucalypts were grown to supply a sawmill that processed the timber to produce pallets.
The sawdust arising from the milling operation was dumped at various localities on the property and not incinerated on account of the danger associated with this operation.
This case deals specifically with the claim by the Plaintiff that as a result of the manner in which the Defendant managed the sawdust, spontaneous combustion occurred. This lead to the wild fire that burnt the neighbouring commercial pine plantation belonging to the Plaintiff.
The Challenges A number of challenges arose in the case but the most important one related specifically to the sawdust. In the summons it was claimed that the sawdust piles constituted a fire hazard in that: • The Defendant had not intermittently layered the sawdust with soil. • The Defendant had not restricted the height of the sawdust heaps so as to avert or minimise the risk of spontaneous combustion occurring in the sawdust pile.
The Plaintiff claimed that these two omissions were largely the reason for the spontaneous combustion occurring.
A third claim was that the Defendant failed to maintain an effective firebreak around the perimeter of the sawdust piles. Such a firebreak - if implemented - would have contained the fire to the sawdust pile.
The Solution While sawdust fires are recognised as being a potential fire risk, SAFIRE Insurance Company Ltd. had at the time that this court action commenced (2012) never received a claim emanating from smouldering sawdust piles.
However there was a single incident reported to SAFIRE of a fire in a sawdust pile, but this was not the result of spontaneous combustion of the pile. This was a fire in sawdust at a sawmill on the farm Etterby in the Richmond district. This fire was extinguished by digging out the smouldering sawdust and dousing the area with water. The fire had entered the sawdust while the landowner was burning a firebreak around the sawdust pile.
Spontaneous combustion does at times occur at composting facilities when the compost heaps self-heat to temperatures high enough to ignite. In these instances no external heat source is required. In order for composting organic material to ignite very specific conditions are required. These are: • A C:N (Carbon:Nitrogen) ratio of 20:1 to 35:1 is required. Sawdust has a C:N ratio of between 300:1 to 400:1. The result of this is that the composting process for pure sawdust will be extremely slow. (Nitrogen is required to feed the micro-organisms that are responsible for the composting process. There is simply not enough of this nutrient for them to thrive!) • The moisture content of the compost heap must be greater than 50%. Below this percentage the composting process slows down. • Aeration is required for rapid, efficient composting. Allowing the organic material to become anaerobic (compacted) will slow the composting process.
In the composting process temperatures in the compost stack rise and can reach 70OC to 80OC as a result of the activity of the micro-organisms breaking down the organic material. Above 80OC micro-organisms die and chemical reactions take over. This chemical heating can continue to raise the temperature of the organic material until it reaches about 150OC at which point ignition can occur. It is important to note that both the biological and chemical oxidation processes require oxygen to proliferate. Progress is extremely slow under low oxygen (anaerobic) conditions.
Back to the spontaneous combustion sawdust pile court case. In this case the Expert for the Plaintiff used the example of silage production, likening the heat build-up in silage to spontaneous combustion. From the previous discussion a number of points arise. The first is that maize used for silage is green and thus contains a high proportion of nitrogen that is required by the micro-organisms to break down this organic material. The organic material is also moist which fulfils the moisture requirement. However, silage is compacted thus resulting in anaerobic conditions. The silage will simply not burst into flame!
Further issues that mitigated against spontaneous combustion in the sawdust on the Defendant’s property were that the sawdust was spread and compacted i.e. this would have limited the oxygen available to the micro-organisms responsible for composting this organic material. The sawdust pile in question was merely one meter deep and any heat build-up would have been rapidly dissipated. Finally, had there been any combustion in the sawdust pile a source of fine ash would have marked the site of ignition. No such evidence was found.
Sawdust waste – like this – is highly unlikely to spontaneously burst into flames due to heat build-up as the rate of decomposition is too slow!
Conclusion Spontaneous combustion will not occur in sawdust. The primary reason being the C:N ration of this organic material. Sawdust fires will invariably be the result of fire from the outside entering the sawdust pile - as was reported in the Richmond case.
The result of the trial was a finding in favour of the Defendant. Spontaneous combustion was ruled out as the origin of the fire, and honey hunting was identified as the source. This activity had set a stump alight which later - under extreme weather conditions - ignited grass on the edge of the sawdust pile. Despite attempts by the Defendant’s team to put the fire out, it swept across the sawdust pile as well as the firebreak around the sawdust pile into a gum compartment and on into the Plaintiff’s property.
