Mega-fires, politics and the force of nature

Ghostly post mega-fire landscape, Southern Cape.

The number and severity of out-of-control wildfires are increasing around the world, causing untold damage to the environment, to infrastructure and the local economies, not to mention the loss of life and suffering of fire victims – both human and animal.

We all know why this is happening … climate change, prolonged dry spells followed by high winds, uncontrolled development on the urban-wildland interface, the proliferation of invasive alien plants leading to high fuel loads, changing land use patterns, poor land management, criminality, negligence and arson.

Yet we live in an environment here in southern Africa that is described as ‘fire-prone’. The natural landscapes around us actually need fire to maintain their ecological integrity. Surely we should have learned to manage these dynamics by now?

The fact of the matter is that fire is a primal force of nature that is not easily controlled, and in some instances is uncontrollable. Therefore human efforts to manage fire are always going to be caught short. Once a big fire is rampaging through a dry landscape with high fuel loads and strong winds behind it, there is no stopping it.

Our best option is to try and manage the conditions that fuel the development of uncontrollable wildfires in the first place, and to get our disaster teams organised to deal with the consequences when they do happen. This is easier said than done, requiring a level of cooperation between land owners, land managers, fire protection associations, fire authorities at all levels of government - and the weather gods – that has thus far escaped us.

Nelson Mandela University has made a huge contribution to efforts to understand and manage the dynamics that surround fire management through the development of a comprehensive Fire Management study programme and the hosting of annual Fire Management symposiums that bring together fire experts from around the country and the world.

Many of these fire experts attended the most recent 13th Fire Management Symposium held at NMU’s George Campus in November last year, thrashing out the issues, comparing notes and networking furiously. Useful, but unlikely to stop the next mega-fire. As one experienced delegate pointed out, we talk and talk but get no closer to achieving the level of collaboration required by all the fire stakeholders to actually make a difference.

Well controlled prescribed burn in the Ukhahlamba Drakensberg Park is designed to reduce fuel loads in an effort to prevent unwanted wildfires.

Perhaps the biggest disappointment is the absence at these symposiums of key government figures who could influence policy and resource allocation at national, provincial and local levels that would enable fire management stakeholders to ramp up their capacity to manage fire.

Forestry companies find themselves in the trenches at the fire-line, spending their own money to protect their plantations and processing facilities from wildfires, many of which are started outside of their boundaries. They prop up local fire protection associations, run fire awareness campaigns and put out fires they didn’t start.

This is where the rubber hits the tar.

One of the highlights of the recent Symposium was the presentation by Montigny Investments’ Risk Manager, Arno Pienaar. The Montigny team operates 80 000 ha of forest land in neighbouring Eswatini, and have implemented an old school ‘military style’ approach to keep fires out of their plantations, with considerable success. These are the same plantations that burnt to the ground in 2008, resulting in the closure of the Usutu pulp mill and the loss of hundreds of jobs. Montigny Investments is now the biggest single employer in Eswatini, and they simply cannot afford to allow another mega-fire to destroy it all again. So they have made their own plans, unconventional but effective (see full story here).

One of the keys to Montigny’s success, and this came up again and again during the symposium, was the need to get local communities on your side to prevent wildfires from happening. Properly on your side. Cut out arson fires started by angry, bored, poor, disgruntled neighbours, and half your battle is won.

This is way easier said than done, and involves a complete overhaul of the socio-economic conditions that prevail in much of southern Africa. It’s complicated, and goes way beyond the scope of the fire management fraternity.

Lessons from a mega-fire

Perhaps it would be useful to re-look at the learnings that Paul Gerber, Chief Executive Officer of the Southern Cape FPA, took from the 2017 mega-fire that turned large swaths of the Southern Cape region between George and PE to a cinder in 2017.

The Southern Cape Fire Protection Association has its hands full keeping wildfires out of this region.

• Overall there is a greater need for integrated fire management.

• Greater focus needs to be directed at awareness of the general public as well as different authorities, concerning the fire hazards that exist in the natural as well as built environment.

• Lack of financial resources: Plans for fire fighting are good but must be implementable by providing ample resources. The emphasis needs to be on being pro-active rather than reactive. A good example here is that helicopters are not deployed early enough while fires are still small and conditions are favourable, because of the high operating costs involved. They are only released when fires have assumed disastrous proportions, by which time conditions are often no longer safe for flying.

• Because of a general shortage of fire-fighting capacity and resources, more emphasis should be placed on pro-active fire prevention measures, especially controlled burns. In the well-known fire triangle, the fuel load, particularly the fine fuel component, is the only factor that can be managed and controlled. This is the factor on which all involved in fire prevention should concentrate.

• The use of media in informing and warning people was not effective. In the recent fire there was a lack of communication with the public/residents, as well as among fire fighting crews during the operations. The need for an independent, dedicated two-way radio communication system during disasters was identified, as communications via existing radio and cell-phone networks proved to be ineffective at times.

• Tactical and operational planning for the combatting of wildfires of this size should rely heavily on local experience and knowledge. With the introduction of authorities from elsewhere to take command, it was found that advice from local fire experts was disregarded.

• All spheres of government involved in fire disasters need to be trained in the incident command system.

• Divisional supervisors (‘fire bosses’) need to be well trained. At the Knysna fire there were not enough qualified fire bosses. Such supervisors need to undergo organised training courses. In the recent fire five FPA managers had to be made available to act as divisional supervisors.

• The need for fire fighting personnel experienced in veld fires who know how to make back-burns, was identified. The holiday resort of Buffalo Bay and the Fairview forest village were saved from being destroyed by judicious back-burns by foresters. It must be noted that some authorities would not give permission for such operations to be conducted.

• In the urban-rural interface, many houses built amongst natural vegetation burnt down. This practice must be reviewed and buildings need defendable space around them in the case of wildfires.

Here are some take-outs from the 13th Fire Management Symposium:-

A common thread of wildfires around the world … droughts followed by heat waves with temps above 40 degrees C and strong winds - Greg Forsyth, CSIR

Symposium presenters fielding questions from the floor (left to right) Ian Pienaar (Montigny), Trevor Abrahams (WoF), Paul Gerber (Southern Cape FPA) and Pam Booth (Knysna Municipality).

10 000 ha burnt in five hours. Final size of the fire: 189 000 ha. Flame lengths: 300 metres - Rodeo-Chediski fire, Arizona, 2002.

When it rains a lot in dry parts of South Africa, beware the following year the risk of wildfires increases - Greg Forsyth, CSIR

Building regulations should take fire risk into account – Greg Forsyth.

More accurate, balanced and informed reporting on fire is needed in SA – Lee Raath Brownie, Fire & Rescue International.

Fires are a people problem – Arno Pienaar, Montigny.

We need 17 000 wildland fire fighters in SA. We have 5 300 – Trevor Abrahams, Working on Fire.

One of the successes of the WoF programme are the many people who come through the programme and move into positions of employment. 60% of WoF managers are former WoF firefighters – Trevor Abrahams.

Working on Fire is a government job creation initiative that trains and deploys young fire fighters who assist landowners in times of need.

We talk and don’t implement. We are still doing it – Paul Gerber, Southern Cape FPA.

The Knysna fire was reported two months before it turned into a big fire. It was left to smoulder – Paul Gerber.

Fire is part of the African landscape. If you exclude it, it will lead to higher fuel loads and ultimately bigger fires – Piet van der Merwe, WoF.

Fires grow exponentially after ignition. The quicker you can get to it, the smaller is the fire and the easier it is to put out. – Piet van der Merwe.

We need to figure out how to capacitate FPAs … almost all of them are dependent on private sector funding – Val Charlton, Land Works.

Integrated fire prevention is a leadership problem more than a funding problem … there is an absence of political leadership and support – Etienne du Toit, Western Cape Government

Fuel load influences all the pillars of your fire management strategy – Deon Greyling, Mondi.

Big fires change the ecology of a landscape – Dr Rachel Loehman, US Geological Survey.

Pine and fynbos are highly flammable and fire prone – Dr Annelise Schutte-Vlok, Cape Nature.

Fire frequency is lower in small and medium grower plantations – Jeffrey le Roux, Sappi.

Everything that happens on the surface of the earth affects the groundwater, which provides 30% of the world’s fresh water. All pollution percolates down into the groundwater. So wildfires and groundwater are intimately linked – Dr Jo Barnes.

The ‘bakkie sakkie’ is the basic equipment that helps foresters keep wildfires out of their plantations.
Rehabilitation work on the go to prevent soil erosion near Knysna after the 2017 inferno.
Stihl knapsacks, blowers and chainsaws on display at the symposium.
Timber salvaged by PG Bison after the 2017 Knysna fires is stacked in a massive wet deck that at its height was 3 km long, 24 metres wide and 4.5 metres high. (Photo courtesy Roger Parsons and Ritchie Morris)
Fighting fires is dangerous work … you need the right gear.
Tiaan Pool, Head of the Forestry, Wood Technology and Veldfire Management Department at Nelson Mandela University, is the driving force behind the Fire Symposiums held at the NMU George campus.


*Check out the related feature: Military approach to fire prevention at Montigny

Discovering the cause and origin of a destructive wildfire

Fire expert Dave Dobson was hired to find the cause and origin of a wildfire that left a swathe of destruction across farms and forestry plantations in the KZN midlands in 2007. Working years after the event, Dave followed the trail of smoke to uncover the origin of the runaway fire that burnt thousands of hectares to a cinder …

The dispute surrounding the ‘Kentucky’ fire of 25th June 2007 that devastated farms and commercial forests in the Curry’s Post area of KwaZulu-Natal has eventually been settled. The fire caused extensive damage to privately owned farms and commercial forest plantations in the area.

As a result of the fire one of the plantation owners instituted legal proceedings against the owners of two properties where the fire was purported to have originated. This case study deals with the case against the second Defendant, the owner of the farm Kentucky.

The challenges
The objective of every fire investigation is to establish the cause and origin of the fire and to determine the ignition sequence.

The first challenge, and one that is regularly encountered in work of this nature, is the fact that I was appointed to investigate the origin and spread of this fire on behalf of the Defendant some seven years after the event (i.e. in 2014).

The Defendant was not a member of the local Fire Protection Association. This raised two issues. The first was that the Defendant was deemed negligent in the event of a fire originating or exiting his property and the onus rested on the Defendant then to prove his innocence. The second issue was that the Defendant was denied access to information held by members of the Fire Protection Association. This was particularly important in respect of the origin of the fire under investigation.

Other issues that contributed to the charge of negligence against the Defendant related to the presence of a compartment of plantation waste/slash located on the boundary between the Defendant’s farm and a neighbouring commercial forest plantation. This was deemed to be a fire risk which contributed to a massive flare-up that resulted in the fire spreading to the Plaintiff’s plantations.

The fires
A number of fires occurred during this period. The first two occurred on the property adjoining Kentucky Farm (St Clair Estate) while the third, as will be shown later, arose on Kentucky Farm. This led unfortunately to the fire becoming known colloquially as ‘the Kentucky Fire’ which was not entirely correct!

The first fire (fire A) occurred on Sunday 24 June 2007. It was extinguished on St Clair Estate (Kentucky’s neighbour) and played no further role in the events that unfolded the following day.

The second fire (fire B) started on the morning of Monday 25 June 2007 on St
Clair Estate and swept through Kentucky Farm fanned by extreme weather conditions.

A third fire (fire C), that was not reported, started on Kentucky Farm during the afternoon of Monday 25 June 2007. This is the fire that resulted in the extensive damage to commercial plantations and farms in the area, which was the focus of this lawsuit.

Data collection
I approached the investigation in a systematic manner beginning with a site visit and an interview with the Defendant. This proved useful in providing circumstantial evidence tracing the progress of the fire through the Defendant’s property. Of particular importance however, was acquainting myself with the overall fire area which was to prove beneficial later in the investigation.

Empirical data was collected in the form of weather data during the time of the fire, interviews and fire reports from various parties who were involved in fighting the fire as well as photographs taken from the spotter aircraft monitoring the fire. A vital piece of evidence was pictures taken of the origin and spread of the fire recorded by Fire Hawk’s locally based fire tower. This information was not readily available to the Defendant since he was not a member of the local Fire Protection Association. However, the picture sequence of the fire was in the public domain as it was being used to conduct Fire Boss Training courses. A simple request for the pictures provided access to this vital piece of information!

In addition, and rather late in the day, an Expert Report was received from the Plaintiff’s legal team.

Cause and origin of the fire
Once the data had been collected and analysed it was possible to develop a hypothesis of the events that occurred on this day. This hypothesis was then subjected to systems analysis to develop a broad understanding of what happened and to avoid linear thinking. This initial hypothesis is depicted in the following diagramme.

In developing this initial hypothesis consideration was given to the summons which suggested that the fire originated from the Sunday night fire (fire A) that had – according to the summons - not been properly extinguished. Various witness statements however refuted this contention. Furthermore, picture evidence obtained from the Fire Hawk camera appeared to indicate that the fire that damaged the Plaintiff’s plantations originated near some homes on the neighbouring St Claire Estate and was the result of a member of the household throwing out ash from the previous night’s hearth fire during the morning of Monday 25 June (fire B).

When examining a problem systematically there are tools in systems thinking that can assist with an enquiry. Systems archetypes are one such tool. As one works with the problem, developing the story, identifying the key variables and sketching them in causal loop diagrams, patterns begin to emerge which provide keys to unlocking parts of the problem. These generic patterns are described in systems thinking as archetypes (Kim, D., H. and Anderson, V. 1998).

A typical “Escalation” archetype now emerges where discarded ash from a previous night’s fire catches alight and starts a fire (fire B). This fire later enters the plantation slash on Kentucky and under deteriorating weather conditions escapes causing havoc to farms and commercial forest plantations down wind. This served as an initial hypothesis for testing against further empirical evidence.

The crucial evidence related to the slash in an old pine compartment located on Kentucky Farm, adjacent to the boundary between Kentucky farm and a neighbouring commercial forestry estate. The trees in this compartment had been clearfelled six years prior to the fire and most of the plantation residue would have decomposed by the time of the fire. Nevertheless the Plaintiff’s Expert presented pictures showing clear lines of fire burning in the old pine compartment which were ascribed to the brush piles having caught alight. The picture also clearly showed a road in the area.

I was aware that no such road existed and began searching for an answer to this conundrum. It turned out that the fire depicted in the photographs was actually burning on a property on the other side of the Curry’s Post road some 1.5 km away! The owner of the property was contacted and confirmation was received that he had in fact cleared and stacked jungle wattle and gum in this area of his farm a few months prior to the fire! The picture of the plantation slash burning that was presented as evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendant was incorrect – the photos were of another property on the other side of the Curry’s Post road.

It was time to test the validity of the evidence of the fire entering and escaping from the old pine compartment on Kentucky Farm.

A closer inspection of the photographic evidence of the fire in the section of Kentucky farm bordering the commercial forest revealed further interesting empirical data. The first was clear evidence – i.e. straight line burns - of firebreak burning in kikuyu camps adjacent to the old pine compartment on Kentucky. Wild fires do not burn in straight lines. From the available photographs it was evident that the party responsible for initiating this firebreak burn lost control of the operation resulting in it entering the old pine slash compartment on Kentucky farm, and subsequently the neighbouring forest where it was brought under control by the land owner. However, the fire in the old pine slash compartment on Kentucky continued to burn. This was fire C.

The events leading to the origin of this fire were never reported, although mention was made in a fire report of drip torches being issued to a helitack ground crew who were dropped in the area in an effort to mop up and contain the fire.

Soon after this, evidence of the fire break between Kentucky and the commercial forest plantation being half burnt indicated a further attempt to contain the fire. The Expert for the Plaintiff (who had previously been contracted by Kentucky’s neighbour to prepare a report on the fire) mentioned the “application of a counter fire along the land owner’s boundary closing up to the main plantation road.”

Clearly there were numerous attempts to introduce counter fires and fire-breaks along this boundary under extreme weather conditions.

At the same time as fire C was burning in the old pine compartment on Kentucky farm, a power failure at the landing strip where the water bombers were refuelling delayed their return to the fire. A further complication arose when weather conditions became too dangerous to fly. Eventually the fire exited the old pine compartment and was driven, out of control, by the extreme weather conditions across many farms before entering the Plaintiff’s commercial pine plantations where extensive damage was experienced.

Final hypothesis
It now becomes possible to develop a final hypothesis describing the fire. This hypothesis is summarised in the diagramme that follows.

Initially as mentioned a preliminary hypothesis was considered which was represented by an “Escalating” archetype: Discarded ash catching alight and resulting in the fire spreading onto Kentucky Farm from whence it enters the slash in the old pine compartment and later spreads to neighbouring farms and forest plantations (fire B).

However, on further investigation a second archetype emerged – a ‘Fixes that Fail’ archetype where an unintended consequence of the use of counter fires or fire-breaks set in an effort to contain fire B, results in the fire escaping and entering the old pine compartment on Kentucky farm from whence, after a delay (indicated by the parallel lines) the fire enters farms and commercial forests causing immense damage (fire C).

An interesting addition to the overall picture is the loop linking Curry’s Post road to the main fire. Pictures of the windrowed plantation slash on a property some 1.5 km away from the Defendant’s farm across the Curry’s Post road from the Defendant was presented as evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendant. This was shown as being clearly incorrect!

Results
After careful consideration of the evidence and interviews with people involved it became clear that the Defendant did not act negligently.
The unintended consequence of trying to “fix” the problem of fire B exiting Kentucky by burning counter fires and fire-breaks on the Defendant’s property is the probable cause of the subsequent damage to farms and forests downwind of Kentucky. This counter fire activity was never reported.

The evidence presented of the extreme fire danger posed by the plantation slash on Kentucky plus the photographic evidence of windrowed slash burning in support of this claim was refuted.
In the end the Plaintiff’s summons was deemed to have no substance and was subsequently withdrawn. The Plaintiff ended up having to pay the Defendant the cost of suit.

References
KIM, D., H., ANDERSON, V. 1998. Systems Archetypes Basics. From Story to Structure. Waltham Massachusetts, Pegasus Communications Inc.