A sorry sight … a fine pine compartment burnt in the Karkloof fire.
Wildfire season has kicked off with a bang in the KwaZulu-Natal midlands with a number of destructive fires that have claimed the lives of 14 people, destroyed dozens of homes and equipment and damaged thousands of hectares of commercial forestry and agricultural land, not to mention the loss of livestock and wildlife.
According to Simon Thomas of the KZN FPA, the number and severity of wildfires in the province has escalated during July due to high fuel loads and extremely hot and dry conditions prevailing across the region.
A wildfire that broke out near Boston in mid-July resulted in the death of seven firefighters who were caught in the flames when the wind suddenly changed direction. Three of the firefighters died on the scene, and four more died later from their injuries.
The firebreak between the pine plantation (right) and the property on the left was hopelessly inadequate and failed to stop the spread of the fire.
Reports have also come through of the recent death of a forester in the Ixopo area who was severely burnt when the wind changed direction causing a controlled burn to run out of control.
Sunday 7th July was another high fire danger day with a number of fires breaking out in Mooi River and Karkloof areas of the midlands. The Mooi River fire reportedly burnt a lot of forestry and conservation land around Mount Gilboa, and another fire in Karkloof that started up later that night burnt through a pine plantation as well as several smallholder farms.
The Zululand coastal area has been fairly quiet, but there have been some big fires in the Melmoth area, also in early July.
Simon says that land managers and fire fighters across the province are on high alert as the hot and dry conditions are continuing. He said that the weather forecast for the weeks ahead are very uncertain, but that there are hopes that early spring rains could bring some relief by mid-September.
In most cases the exact cause of the fires is very difficult to determine, but fingers have been pointed at deliberate arson fires. This seems to be the cause of the Karkloof fire as the ignition point is clearly identifiable in the landscape. According to local people there was no lightning on the day of the fire to cause ignition, and the Mooi River fire was too far away to have caused spotting.
Local smallholders in the area say that the fire breaks prepared by the plantation managers are hopelessly inadequate and did not prevent the fire – which was fanned by winds up to 70 km per hour - from entering their adjacent properties. Three dwellings were also destroyed in the blaze.
Greg Gardiner surveys the wreckage of his family home that was burnt to the ground in the Karkloof fire.
The remains of Greg Gardiner’s water tanks, destroyed by the wildfire.
Poachers have been fingered for starting the Boston fire. Apparently the poachers light the bush to drive out the animals so that they can hunt them down, and then the fire gets away.
Land managers are urged to be alert so that they can respond quickly to any fires starting on their properties. It is much easier to put out a fire when it is still small than it is to tackle a fire that is running out of control.
Members of the public are also urged to be vigilant, and to not start any fires in the open – especially on high fire danger days.
All landowners in fire-prone rural areas should be members of the local fire protection association, which are there to provide assistance and support throughout the fire season.
Three weeks after the fire …
Wildfires are set to become commonplace
Here's how World Cup rugby star and farmer Kwagga Smith prepares for fire season...
The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) reports that the increasing urbanisation of South Africa’s rapidly growing population is a significant factor impacting the risk of wildfires. They explain: “More and more people, assets and infrastructure are placed on the boundary or interface between developed land and fire-prone vegetation – what we call the wildland-urban interface (WUI) – where they are exposed to wildfires.” They go on to say that the combination of climate and vegetation characteristics that favour fires, and growing human exposure, results in significant wildfire risk across the country, especially in the southern and eastern parts.
“Unfortunately, the situation will not improve because climate change will result in more frequent and extended high fire danger periods and, therefore, an increased likelihood of severe fires,” they further add, advising that the best option is to reduce fire risks and keep them as low as possible.
Kwagga Smith a world-cup winning rugby player, is also a farmer in one of the highest fire-risk areas in our country. “The Dullstroom area has experienced some devastating fires and as a farmer, you need to be prepared at all times. Drawing from his personal experience, he shares valuable advice on fire prevention and safety.
These are his five top tips for BEING PREPARED for fire season:
Burn fire breaks
Start this process in summer rather than waiting until after the first frost. Burn the tracer lines so that it’s easy to burn the breaks after the frost kills the grass in winter. Apply glyphosate using sprayers to create a 1m wide strip along the fence line and another 1m strip about 20m into the farm. Once this grass dies off, burn it. Then wait for the frost, which will kill the grass in the 20m strip between the tracer lines. After the frost, burn this area. This final burned strip becomes your firebreak.
Skill up, Gear up
A fire break will not stop a fire though; it’s there to give you space to work from. Back burning, beating or some other form of firefighting, will still be necessary to stop a fire from spreading. It is, thus, essential that everyone is skilled and equipped to be able to manage fires.
Invest wisely
When you’re facing a raging inferno, any money saved from buying inferior equipment can quickly become a costly mistake. Rather invest in quality machinery that will perform reliably when it is needed most.
Be ready
Before fire season, service and test all necessary equipment. Make sure pumps and leaf blowers are easily accessible, chainsaws are sharp, tractors are fuelled, fire beaters are intact, and your ‘bakkie-sakkie’ is full. This will ensure that everything you need is ready and on standby. In the case of an emergency, preparedness can make all the difference.
Share the Responsibility
Fire defence shouldn't rely on a single person. It's crucial that multiple people know who to call and what to do in an emergency. Ensure that several individuals can take charge if you are not around, thereby creating a more robust fire response system.
“My dad always said “Goedkoop is duurkoop” – “Penny wise, pound foolish”. That’s why our family invests in Husqvarna’s sprayers, chainsaws, blowers and pumps to ensure we have quality, reliable equipment on hand in the event of a fire. You never know when you will need it and being prepared can make all the difference,” concludes Kwagga.
The FireHawk cameras mounted on the Marten Mountain Lookout Tower in Canada were monitored by the FireHawk ops room in Chile.
The South African-developed FireHawk wildfire detection system has been found to be the most effective fixed fire detection and reporting system in an international trial that took place in Canada recently.
FireHawk combines human skill with artificial intelligence to keep watch over two million hectares of forest land around the world, alerting landowners and triggering rapid response whenever a fire is detected.
Willem Oosthuizen, CEO of FireHawk South Africa, explains: “The Alberta Wildfire Detection Challenge was a collaboration between Alberta Wildfire, Alberta Innovates, and FPInnovations. Six commercially-available fixed fire detection systems were installed and operated on the Marten Mountain Lookout tower near Slave Lake, Alberta, Canada, during the 2022 wildfire season. The aim was to test these fire detection systems in an operational environment in an area that experiences an average of 20 wildfires annually.”
The trial programme organisers invited 17 leading fire detection service providers from around the world to submit applications. This was narrowed down to the best six applicants who were selected to take part in the challenge. The selected applicants were provided a contract with funding to demonstrate their systems using their own proprietary equipment. A total of 54 events were recorded during the test period, and of these 14 were real wildfires and 33 were test smokes.
The Marten Mountain Fire Lookout Tower manned by local fire watch personnel also participated in the trial in order to provide comparative data.
The FireHawk cameras mounted on the Marten Mountain Lookout Tower were monitored remotely from FireHawk’s operations base in Chile for the trial.
Study location All systems were installed on the Marten Mountain Lookout tower in Alberta, Canada. The tower is 20 km north of the Town of Slave Lake. The 40 km radius of the lookout coverage area has the following views: to the west is the waterbody of Slave Lake; to the east is a hill that limits visibility; to the south is the town of Slave Lake and the Mitsue industrial area; to the north is forest. Boreal forest species are the primary vegetation cover. Many industrial activities such as forestry, oil, and gas are also spread across the landscape.
This boreal forest area experiences a high number of wildfires due to a high number of lightning strikes and human activities. In 2011, a wildfire entered the town of Slave Lake and burned around 500 structures.
Evaluation metrics Four metrics were used to evaluate the performance of the detection systems: detection distance, reporting efficiency, location accuracy, and system availability.
Detection distance Results show the Marten Mountain Lookout observer was effective at the 40 km distance for both test smokes and wildfires. In addition, the lookout observer also detected a wildfire smoke at 46 km.
Of the six fixed detection systems, FireHawk had the best performance with an 88% detection success rate between 10 and 20 km on test smokes, and 78% between 20 and 30 km.
Reporting efficiency FireHawk had the fastest average time reporting test smokes among the six systems: 3 minutes @ 5-10 kms; 6 minutes @ 10-20 kms; 10 mins @ 20-30 kms; 7 mins @ 30-40 kms.
The Marten Mountain Lookout observer was the best performer of all trialists with an average of 4 minutes over all distances. The rest of the fixed systems exceeded 10 minutes.
System availability The total number of operational hours between July 1 and September 15 (8:00 am to 8:00 pm daily) was 924 hours.
The Marten Mountain Lookout observer did not have any downtime. Neither did FireHawk, which recorded 100% availability.
Firehawk systems use human operators. The data shows that these systems perform better than systems that do not have human operators.
Location accuracy IQ FireWatch had the best accuracy on reporting locations and was better than the Marten Mountain lookout’s performance. SmokeD was second overall, but the sample numbers were too low beyond 10 kms to determine the reliability of the result.
Night detection Night detection is the detection service provided during low or no sunlight. ForestWatch, SmokeD, and FireHawk chose to provide detection coverage outside of the operational period which included night detection. Only eight detection messages from public reporting and FireHawk were considered as night detection.
These results show that FireHawk has the ability to detect fires during night time. Two successful night detections were the results of an attended fire and a car fire. These two detection successes suggest that this type of detection system could be used as a monitoring tool at night.
Human operators Firehawk, IQ FireWatch, ForestWatch, and SmokeD systems used human operators. The data showed that these systems performed better than systems that did not have human operators.
FireHawk also had the lowest number of false alarms at 11 over the two and a half months trial period.
“We are proud that our FireHawk system experienced no downtime during the detection challenge, and had the highest number of detection successes among the systems taking part in the programme,” said Willem. “It was a privilege to take part in this international testing of different wildfire detection systems.”
Where it all began After 16 years of experience in aerial spraying and aerial fire fighting, Jake Oosthuizen formed Zululand Fire Protection Services cc. (ZFPS) in 1994 with the object of providing a service to the Zululand timber industry. Initially, the operation was started by taking over the control centre of the Zululand Fire Protection Association (ZFPA), which coordinated all fire fighting operations in the Zululand Coastal Area (approximately 80 000 hectares of timber).
At that time, the Control Centre had a very low profile and provided a basic communication service to the timber growers in the area. Over time, the Control Centre became the heart of all firefighting operations in Zululand. ZFPS expanded to include the management of ZIFPA.
In 1994, ZFPS was instrumental in the development of the FireHawk system that is today used in South Africa, Chile, Brazil, Malawi and Ghana.
FireHawk was the first computerized fire detection system in the world and has been operating commercially for the past 28 years. The first system was installed in Richmond in 1994 and is still operational today.
This is where it all started … the first FireHawk system was installed in Richmond, KwaZulu-Natal in 1994, and is still operational today.
The FireHawk system uses 360 degrees rotating high definition digital cameras to monitor areas and transmits information to a base station that is manned by operators. The software differentiates between fire, smoke and glow, and then raises an alarm. Positioning is done from a single camera, with the ability to cross reference for improved accuracy.
FireHawk now monitors approximately 591 000 hectares of timber plantations in KwaZulu-Natal, the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga.
It also monitors 650 000 ha of timber in Chile, 155 000 ha in Brazil, 4 000 ha of sugar cane in Malawi and 600 000 ha of Burmese Teak in Ghana.
How the Montigny team keep unwanted fire out of their Eswatini plantations …
A return to sound forestry practices of the past coupled with the introduction of a military-style approach to fire management at Montigny Investments forests in Eswatini has had a big impact in reducing the number and severity of wildfires experienced in the company’s plantations. Key factors in the turnaround include improved community relations, a zero tolerance approach to arson and crime, well trained and drilled ground-based fire teams and astute use of tried and tested ‘old fashioned’ fire prevention methods coupled with modern technology.
Commercial tree plantations in Eswatini – particularly the Usutu plantation - have a history of fire, due to a combination of rugged, mountainous terrain, extreme weather events and a proliferation of arson fires.
Massive fires in 2007/8 destroyed large swaths of the Usutu pine plantation (then owned by Sappi) resulting in the eventual closure of the Usutu pulp mill and the loss of hundreds of jobs.
Montigny Investments, a Swazi owned and operated, integrated timber business, purchased the Usutu forests in 2014, bringing their total land holding to 80 000 ha of which 50 000 ha is planted. The Montigny team is renowned for its innovative and highly practical approach to business, and this approach was applied to the development of a fire prevention strategy that is designed to keep their plantations safe from massive fires such as the one that destroyed Usutu in 2007.
Aerial view of Montigny timber processing facility, Eswatini. Montigny processes more than one million tons of timber a year.
According to Montigny Forestry Manager Jurgens Kritzinger, they looked at the history of fires in the plantations that they operate, and discovered that in the old days there were fewer fires, less damage, better roads, good relationships with neighbouring communities and own operations. As time went by the ownership changes at Usutu led to outsourcing of operations, unhappy people and more arson fires.
The Montigny team turned the ship around by going back to some of the best practices that worked well in the past, re-introduced own ops using their own people and own equipment, put huge emphasis on building community relationships, invested in improved roads, planted dynamic wattle belts and employed a military expert to help them adopt a military-style approach to fire prevention.
Arno Pienaar was serving with a security company in Iraq when he was head hunted by Montigny to head up their fire and risk management function in 2015. Surprisingly, at the time of his appointment Arno had zero forestry experience and zero fire management experience. But the Montigny management were confident they had enough people with forestry and plantation fire experience already – what they needed was Arno’s military expertise.
Arno Pienaar … Montigny Group Risk Manager, presenting at the13th Fire Management Symposium at Nelson Mandela University’s George Campus, South Africa.
In 2015, the Montigny approach to fire management was introduced, with immediate results. That year the company suffered damage to just 18.4 hectares of plantation as a result of wildfire. Prior to that, average annual fire damage was 1 000 hectares. There was also a marked decline in the number of arson fires recorded.
This was not just a flash in the pan, a lucky break! The ever improving fire stats have been sustained to the present day, and speak for themselves:-
YEAR
HECTARES DAMAGED BY FIRE
ARSON FIRES
2014
606 ha
–
2015 (new system introduced)
18.4 ha
19
2016
74.8 ha
11
2017
0
6
2018
45 ha
5
2019
590 ha
6
2020
4.3 ha
1
2021
145 ha
8
2022
2.9 ha
5
Arno provided some insights into the Montigny approach to fire prevention at the 13th Fire Management Symposium held at Nelson Mandela University’s George campus in November 2022.
Fighting fires is a bit like fighting a battle, he said. Success depends upon clear objectives, good preparation and intelligence, the availability of well trained personnel on the ground, the right tools and plenty of ammunition.
All the elements of fire management were carefully analysed in the process of developing a comprehensive strategy that left no stone unturned: fuel load management and fire break preparation, fire detection, reaction, suppression, command and control at the fire front and in the control room, mop up and patrols.
Good intelligence is crucial, explained Arno. Know all the relevant facts.
Reducing the number of arson fires was a key priority. They analysed where arson fires were started, what time of the day (or night) they occur, the phase of the moon. People are predictable and criminal activities follow a pattern – understand the patterns and your counter measures will be more accurate, he said.
Manual harvesting and tractor-trailer short haul at Montigny South, Eswatini, maximises jobs from forestry operations. The Montigny Group employs 11 600 people making it one of the biggest employers in Eswatini.
Getting the community on side
Getting the community on their side was a key part of the strategy. Montigny is renowned for their community programmes. They have established an entire village at Bulembu that looks after over 350 orphaned and vulnerable kids, just one of a number of community projects which provide a good foundation upon which to build community relations.
A dedicated K9 team that breeds and trains bloodhounds to track and find anyone engaging in criminal activity on Montigny property has proved to be an extremely effective deterrent to crime and arson, but has also helped get the community on their side. Most of the K9 missions currently undertaken are in fact solving crimes against the communities living in and around Montigny plantations. Crime doesn’t only affect the forestry company – it also affects the communities deeply, and safety and security is high up on their priority of needs.
Now the criminals know that they are not going to get away with it, says Arno. Even if they don’t secure a conviction, the criminals are pointed out and the community knows who the trouble-makers are – they are the same people who start arson fires. Even the police frequently request assistance from the Montigny K9 team. Thus the community has become an ally and a valuable source of intelligence. So much so that the community stepped up and helped the Montigny team protect the plantation during the unrest that swept across Eswatini in 2021.
They also changed the rules around not allowing employees to give people lifts in company vehicles inside the plantations. A small thing, but the spinoff is significant.
“How can you drive past somebody in your company bakkie with Montigny signage on the side who has to walk 10 kilometres to the nearest bus stop, and expect them to support you?” asked Arno.
It’s this kind of thinking that changes mind-sets.
“The people on the ground realise that we are there to help them – not just to make money for ourselves,” said Arno.
Montigny forestry creates local jobs and utilises a network of subcontractors for timber transport and other operations.
Staff selection and training
Staff selection and training is another key part of the strategy. Dedicated fire teams have very specific tasks and are drilled military-style until they are extremely fit and are experts at their job.
The Montigny team has cancelled their expensive plantation fire camera detection system and have instead established a network of old fashioned fire watch towers with 24-hour surveillance over every inch of the plantation. The tower guards report any smoke detected instantly to the control room, setting in motion a chain of action from highly trained fire-fighting teams that are geared to get to the fire front within 8 minutes.
The fire watch towers also contribute to preventing crime as the guards report any irregular or unscheduled activity in the plantation, which will be followed up and investigated by one of the 300 Montigny field rangers patrolling the plantation.
“We put out any fire that we detect within three kilometres of our boundary,” said Arno. “This is our rule, and there should be no deviation from it.”
A hard lesson was learned in 2019 when a fire was detected outside the Montigny boundary, but within the three km zone. The fire-fighting teams had been busy fighting another fire and were exhausted. Arno was instructed to leave the new fire as it was not in the path of the prevailing wind and was considered low risk. He was told that he was pushing the fire-fighting teams too hard. So he reluctantly left that fire. But the weather turned, the wind picked up and it entered the Montigny plantation and caused extensive damage. Lesson learned!
“You cannot make emotional decisions,” states Arno. The rules are the rules. No deviation.
Montigny fire team at the ready.
Fire boss training
Fire bosses were identified as a key link in the chain of command, and they receive dedicated, customised training. The Montigny team has developed a user-friendly software app that gives fire bosses instant access to critical info about fuel loads, terrain and weather at the fire site, as well as availability and location of fire-fighting teams and equipment, enabling them to make quick, informed decisions.
Arno says that in their experience aerial bombers have not been very effective, especially in the mountainous terrain as they have to drop their water from too high, so they rather rely on ground-based fire-fighting teams backed up with customised fire tenders and bakkie sakkies. Ground crews are needed to mop up after an aerial water drop in any event, so that is where they have invested their resources.
“In the military we know that the air force can give you the initiative, but it’s ground troops that will win you the war,” said Arno.
One of the biggest problems encountered by fire-fighters in rugged terrain is that they run out of water at some point, and the fire gets away while the troops are desperately trying to get more water to the fire line. Arno says this is unacceptable – you can’t afford to run out of ammunition in the middle of a battle. He saw a demonstration of a compressed air foam system and realised this could help extend the capacity of their fire-fighting units to extinguish fires. Now the Montigny fire tenders fitted with CAF systems use 10% water to 90% fire retardant foam to douse fires. This allows the water in the fire tender to last much longer, while also making the hoses lighter and easier to handle, allowing fire fighters to reach the fire front faster. He says his teams can deploy a 180 metre fire hose inside a compartment in 1.5 minutes. Speed is everything.
Using 90% fire retardant foam to 10% water turns a 7 000 litre fire tender into a 70 000 litre fire-fighting resource.
He likened the ‘chaos’ of a wildfire to the ‘chaos’ that troops experience during a gun battle.
“We broke down the 'chaos' element into small bits,” said Arno. Each element is analysed, prepared for and practiced over and over.
The Montigny team’s success in stopping wildfires quickly before they get out of control has significantly improved as a result of cool heads, good management and well trained fire-fighters.
However effective fire prevention starts long before the outbreak of an actual fire and involves every aspect of the forestry operation from budget allocation to fire break preparation, fuel load reduction and slash management, access road design and maintenance, personnel selection and training, community relations, equipment selection and availability, vigilance and readiness.
This takes a team effort and total alignment throughout the organisation with very clear objectives, concluded Arno.
Air drying timber at Montigny South, Eswatini. The Montigny team is able to extract maximum value from each and every tree that they harvest due to the diversity of markets that they supply.
‘Preparing for the next Mega Fire’ is the theme of the 13th Fire Management Symposium, scheduled to be held at the Nelson Mandela University’s (NMU) George Campus from 23 to 25 November.
Effective wildfire management is impeded by a lack of integration between research results, technological development, and efforts by fire managers. In the end all strive to prevent, suppress and protect the environment, human wellbeing, and assets against wildfire.
This event aims to integrate the efforts of natural resource managers, engineers, and scientists through an integrated approach.
The Symposium will bring together fire managers and authorities from different disciplines and land uses including nature conservation, agriculture, disaster management, forestry and local authorities, for a range of informative presentations and exciting networking opportunities.
The choice of George as a venue to host the Symposium is appropriate as it is situated in the scenic southern Cape which experienced one of the worst fires in the history of South Africa on 7 June 2017. Exactly one year later another mega fire swept through the Southern Cape, so this region knows all too well about wildfires.
The George campus is also the venue for the highly acclaimed Fire Management programme offered by NMU which equips aspirant foresters and land managers with a deeper understanding of fire dynamics and the practical application of fire risk reduction, fire management and suppression.
The Symposium brings together top rated international and South African-based fire management specialists who will share their expertise in a very practical and applied manner. Internationally renowned fire scientist Prof Pete Fule will deliver the first keynote address.
The 2nd day of the event is a field day that will provide opportunities for Symposium participants to visit the Southern Cape region to observe the unique vegetation and take note of fire related issues - hosted by the Southern Cape Fire Protection Association.
For more information contact tiaan.pool@mandela.ac.za or Hannes.vanZyl@mandela.ac.za or sonia.roets@mandela.ac.za.
Discovering the cause and origin of a destructive wildfire
Fire expert Dave Dobson was hired to find the cause and origin of a wildfire that left a swathe of destruction across farms and forestry plantations in the KZN midlands in 2007. Working years after the event, Dave followed the trail of smoke to uncover the origin of the runaway fire that burnt thousands of hectares to a cinder …
The dispute surrounding the ‘Kentucky’ fire of 25th June 2007 that devastated farms and commercial forests in the Curry’s Post area of KwaZulu-Natal has eventually been settled. The fire caused extensive damage to privately owned farms and commercial forest plantations in the area.
As a result of the fire one of the plantation owners instituted legal proceedings against the owners of two properties where the fire was purported to have originated. This case study deals with the case against the second Defendant, the owner of the farm Kentucky.
The challenges The objective of every fire investigation is to establish the cause and origin of the fire and to determine the ignition sequence.
The first challenge, and one that is regularly encountered in work of this nature, is the fact that I was appointed to investigate the origin and spread of this fire on behalf of the Defendant some seven years after the event (i.e. in 2014).
The Defendant was not a member of the local Fire Protection Association. This raised two issues. The first was that the Defendant was deemed negligent in the event of a fire originating or exiting his property and the onus rested on the Defendant then to prove his innocence. The second issue was that the Defendant was denied access to information held by members of the Fire Protection Association. This was particularly important in respect of the origin of the fire under investigation.
Other issues that contributed to the charge of negligence against the Defendant related to the presence of a compartment of plantation waste/slash located on the boundary between the Defendant’s farm and a neighbouring commercial forest plantation. This was deemed to be a fire risk which contributed to a massive flare-up that resulted in the fire spreading to the Plaintiff’s plantations.
The fires A number of fires occurred during this period. The first two occurred on the property adjoining Kentucky Farm (St Clair Estate) while the third, as will be shown later, arose on Kentucky Farm. This led unfortunately to the fire becoming known colloquially as ‘the Kentucky Fire’ which was not entirely correct!
The first fire (fire A) occurred on Sunday 24 June 2007. It was extinguished on St Clair Estate (Kentucky’s neighbour) and played no further role in the events that unfolded the following day.
The second fire (fire B) started on the morning of Monday 25 June 2007 on St Clair Estate and swept through Kentucky Farm fanned by extreme weather conditions.
A third fire (fire C), that was not reported, started on Kentucky Farm during the afternoon of Monday 25 June 2007. This is the fire that resulted in the extensive damage to commercial plantations and farms in the area, which was the focus of this lawsuit.
Data collection I approached the investigation in a systematic manner beginning with a site visit and an interview with the Defendant. This proved useful in providing circumstantial evidence tracing the progress of the fire through the Defendant’s property. Of particular importance however, was acquainting myself with the overall fire area which was to prove beneficial later in the investigation.
Empirical data was collected in the form of weather data during the time of the fire, interviews and fire reports from various parties who were involved in fighting the fire as well as photographs taken from the spotter aircraft monitoring the fire. A vital piece of evidence was pictures taken of the origin and spread of the fire recorded by Fire Hawk’s locally based fire tower. This information was not readily available to the Defendant since he was not a member of the local Fire Protection Association. However, the picture sequence of the fire was in the public domain as it was being used to conduct Fire Boss Training courses. A simple request for the pictures provided access to this vital piece of information!
In addition, and rather late in the day, an Expert Report was received from the Plaintiff’s legal team.
Cause and origin of the fire Once the data had been collected and analysed it was possible to develop a hypothesis of the events that occurred on this day. This hypothesis was then subjected to systems analysis to develop a broad understanding of what happened and to avoid linear thinking. This initial hypothesis is depicted in the following diagramme.
In developing this initial hypothesis consideration was given to the summons which suggested that the fire originated from the Sunday night fire (fire A) that had – according to the summons - not been properly extinguished. Various witness statements however refuted this contention. Furthermore, picture evidence obtained from the Fire Hawk camera appeared to indicate that the fire that damaged the Plaintiff’s plantations originated near some homes on the neighbouring St Claire Estate and was the result of a member of the household throwing out ash from the previous night’s hearth fire during the morning of Monday 25 June (fire B).
When examining a problem systematically there are tools in systems thinking that can assist with an enquiry. Systems archetypes are one such tool. As one works with the problem, developing the story, identifying the key variables and sketching them in causal loop diagrams, patterns begin to emerge which provide keys to unlocking parts of the problem. These generic patterns are described in systems thinking as archetypes (Kim, D., H. and Anderson, V. 1998).
A typical “Escalation” archetype now emerges where discarded ash from a previous night’s fire catches alight and starts a fire (fire B). This fire later enters the plantation slash on Kentucky and under deteriorating weather conditions escapes causing havoc to farms and commercial forest plantations down wind. This served as an initial hypothesis for testing against further empirical evidence.
The crucial evidence related to the slash in an old pine compartment located on Kentucky Farm, adjacent to the boundary between Kentucky farm and a neighbouring commercial forestry estate. The trees in this compartment had been clearfelled six years prior to the fire and most of the plantation residue would have decomposed by the time of the fire. Nevertheless the Plaintiff’s Expert presented pictures showing clear lines of fire burning in the old pine compartment which were ascribed to the brush piles having caught alight. The picture also clearly showed a road in the area.
I was aware that no such road existed and began searching for an answer to this conundrum. It turned out that the fire depicted in the photographs was actually burning on a property on the other side of the Curry’s Post road some 1.5 km away! The owner of the property was contacted and confirmation was received that he had in fact cleared and stacked jungle wattle and gum in this area of his farm a few months prior to the fire! The picture of the plantation slash burning that was presented as evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendant was incorrect – the photos were of another property on the other side of the Curry’s Post road.
Brush burning 1.5 km away from the Kentucky fire.
It was time to test the validity of the evidence of the fire entering and escaping from the old pine compartment on Kentucky Farm.
A closer inspection of the photographic evidence of the fire in the section of Kentucky farm bordering the commercial forest revealed further interesting empirical data. The first was clear evidence – i.e. straight line burns - of firebreak burning in kikuyu camps adjacent to the old pine compartment on Kentucky. Wild fires do not burn in straight lines. From the available photographs it was evident that the party responsible for initiating this firebreak burn lost control of the operation resulting in it entering the old pine slash compartment on Kentucky farm, and subsequently the neighbouring forest where it was brought under control by the land owner. However, the fire in the old pine slash compartment on Kentucky continued to burn. This was fire C.
Unburnt Kikuyu camps on Kentucky Farm. Fire heading to the Kentucky homestead.
The events leading to the origin of this fire were never reported, although mention was made in a fire report of drip torches being issued to a helitack ground crew who were dropped in the area in an effort to mop up and contain the fire.
Soon after this, evidence of the fire break between Kentucky and the commercial forest plantation being half burnt indicated a further attempt to contain the fire. The Expert for the Plaintiff (who had previously been contracted by Kentucky’s neighbour to prepare a report on the fire) mentioned the “application of a counter fire along the land owner’s boundary closing up to the main plantation road.”
Clearly there were numerous attempts to introduce counter fires and fire-breaks along this boundary under extreme weather conditions.
At the same time as fire C was burning in the old pine compartment on Kentucky farm, a power failure at the landing strip where the water bombers were refuelling delayed their return to the fire. A further complication arose when weather conditions became too dangerous to fly. Eventually the fire exited the old pine compartment and was driven, out of control, by the extreme weather conditions across many farms before entering the Plaintiff’s commercial pine plantations where extensive damage was experienced.
Final hypothesis It now becomes possible to develop a final hypothesis describing the fire. This hypothesis is summarised in the diagramme that follows.
Initially as mentioned a preliminary hypothesis was considered which was represented by an “Escalating” archetype: Discarded ash catching alight and resulting in the fire spreading onto Kentucky Farm from whence it enters the slash in the old pine compartment and later spreads to neighbouring farms and forest plantations (fire B).
However, on further investigation a second archetype emerged – a ‘Fixes that Fail’ archetype where an unintended consequence of the use of counter fires or fire-breaks set in an effort to contain fire B, results in the fire escaping and entering the old pine compartment on Kentucky farm from whence, after a delay (indicated by the parallel lines) the fire enters farms and commercial forests causing immense damage (fire C).
An interesting addition to the overall picture is the loop linking Curry’s Post road to the main fire. Pictures of the windrowed plantation slash on a property some 1.5 km away from the Defendant’s farm across the Curry’s Post road from the Defendant was presented as evidence of negligence on the part of the Defendant. This was shown as being clearly incorrect!
Results After careful consideration of the evidence and interviews with people involved it became clear that the Defendant did not act negligently. The unintended consequence of trying to “fix” the problem of fire B exiting Kentucky by burning counter fires and fire-breaks on the Defendant’s property is the probable cause of the subsequent damage to farms and forests downwind of Kentucky. This counter fire activity was never reported.
The evidence presented of the extreme fire danger posed by the plantation slash on Kentucky plus the photographic evidence of windrowed slash burning in support of this claim was refuted. In the end the Plaintiff’s summons was deemed to have no substance and was subsequently withdrawn. The Plaintiff ended up having to pay the Defendant the cost of suit.
References KIM, D., H., ANDERSON, V. 1998. Systems Archetypes Basics. From Story to Structure. Waltham Massachusetts, Pegasus Communications Inc.
New association for wildland firefighters launched
A new association for Wildland Firefighters has been launched in South Africa. The Association for Wildland Firefighters (AWF) represents the wildland firefighting industry and associated professionals in Southern Africa.
“Numerous investigations into some disastrous fires in Southern Africa highlighted the need for a formal body to represent the needs of the wildland firefighter. The AWF aims to develop the knowledge, skills, understanding and competence of wildland firefighting in South Africa,” says Etienne Du Toit, the chairperson of the AWF.
Du Toit says the organization aims to improve the standards of safety and the working environment for firefighters in the sector in which its members operate.
The Association is registered as an independent, non-governmental, non-profit organisation. Any person or organisation associated with the wildland firefighting/integrated fire management fraternity qualifies to be members.
Du Toit says that climate change has resulted in a significant increase in wildfire risk, not only to responders but also to civilians.
“Monetary losses and other damages as result of these fires annually exceeds hundreds of millions. More needs to be done to address these risks. This is where the AWF comes in, an organisation that aims to share learning in such a manner that it promotes professionalism, reduces responder and civilian risk and at the same time allows for continuous improvement in all aspects of integrated wildfire management.”
The new association specifically addresses the needs of the wildfire fraternity.
“Until now, no other association specifically addressed the needs of the wildfire fraternity, there are similar associations but these are more focused on the structural firefighting sector,” says Du Toit.
The founders of the organisation come from a variety of backgrounds, including the fire service, forestry and conservation sectors and include business development practitioners with vast practical experience in these sectors.
“This Association seeks to enhance synergies between the various entities responsible for wildfire and integrated fire management, and one of the main aims is to professionalise the wildfire fighting industry in SA,” he said.
For more info contact Tessa Oliver at email: info@wildlandfire.org.za
